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Three Essays in Conversational Ethics
Director: Ray Lanfear
"Merleau-Ponty's Dissolution of the 'Problem of the Other':
A New Vision for Ethics":
Traditional accounts of the mind have been biased toward the
interiority of the mind. This has led to an account of
subjectivity that creates "the problem of other minds." As a
consequence, descriptions of moral communities have always
had the anxiety of that problem hanging in the background.
Merleau-Ponty offers an account of perceptual consciousness
that avoids the problems that follow from the model of the
interiorized subject.
In turn, an account of the moral
community must be given that does not have the anxiety of
'the problem of the other' hanging in the background.
"Wittgenstein's Two Senses of 'Understanding'":
Wittgenstein contends in the Philosophical Investigations
there are two senses of 'understanding': paraphrastic and
intransitive understanding. The second, intransitive
understanding, serves a special purpose in our lives— it
pulls us out of our habitual and prejudicial ways of speaking
and being. The only problem is that it creates new habits
and prejudices, because we are tempted to think of our new
ways of speaking as more accurate or better than the previous
ones. Attempts to create a style of speaking that avoids
this pitfall have not worked out (e.g., Heidegger), which
leads us to a suspicion that style alone does not resist
literalization. New styles of speaking must be coupled with
a state of character that steels us to resist the temptations
to make divinities of our ways of speaking.
"Plato's Meno and a Problem for Moral Education":
The Meno provides a model for moral education, but there are
gaps in it. That is, the dialogue maps a progression a
successful student makes, but being in one state is not a
sufficient condition for the progression to the next state.
A student must come to see the goods internal to a life of
excellence instead of pursuing excellence for the sake of
external goods, and this transformation cannot be brought
about by anyone but the student herself. The transformation
comes out of nowhere— it cannot be conditioned. As a
consequence, the most convenient manner of describing this
change of character is as a question of grace. In turn, I
contend the dialogue's conclusion is a gesture toward this
problem.

Preface

These three essays are essays in ethics.

All of them

start off with relatively complex technical and
epistemological issues, but ultimately boil down to a basic
question:

what sort of contributions do we want to make to

our moral and philosophical communities?

In this reduction

of technical and epistemological questions to ethical
questions, I am hoping to draw attention to a simple idea.
Namely, at the foundations of our systematics, we have
certain powerful and compelling experiences that inform our
intuitions of how the systematics should work.

We catch

glimpses of what we would like our lives to be, what we would
like our institutions to be.

They are landmarks by which we

orient ourselves both as philosophers and as human beings.
We judge our lives and others' by these standards.

What I

see in common with these standards is the fact that we in our
visions of the good life prefer spontaneity and dialogue to
coersion and soliloquy.

We see how we best get along with

others, how our relationships are most fulfilling, how we
resist the cultural homogeneity that seems to envelop and
entrap even our best attempts to be genuine.
"Merleau-Ponty and the Dissolution of 'the Problem of
the Other': a New Vision for Ethics" takes a similar tack by
the fact in it I contend our ethics is colored by how we view
iii

iv
otherness.

When otherness must be constructed, our ethics

are stiff.

That is, we can describe how to act morally, but

we cannot describe how we get along.

Moreover, when

otherness as other is unavailable— as Sartre would contend—
our relations are fundamentally conflictual.

However, if we

construe otherness as something discovered in the world with
us, we find an agreement between ourselves and others which
must be prior to our social-contractual agreements.

We can

see how our moral intuitions are informed by how we fall into
spontaneous rapport with others.
I try in "Wittgenstein's Two Senses of 'Understanding'"
to describe the problems facing us when we reflect upon our
moments of spontaneity— how when we priviledge the habit of
particularly moving or compelling moments, we fall back into
formulaic interactions with each other all over again.

It is

not that I am lamenting the fact that we seem not to be able
to find a descriptive strategy that always avoids becoming
entraping.

However, I am looking into how we would have to

live in order to avoid being captured by certain pictures of
language, mind, or even the good life.
"Plato's Meno and a Problem for Moral Education" is an
essay on the chasm between the necessary conditions for
successful moral education and the sufficient conditions.
What Plato shows in the Meno is how, even though the value of
pursuing inquiry in a friendly and conversational manner
seems self-evident, people still miss it.

They simply do not

V

see it.

When we try to convince someone to take up a new

manner or framework for investigations, we can show that
person the new framework, compare it to the old framework,
even train that person to make use of the framework.

But we

can never instill an appreciation for the framework itself in
a person.
themselves.

Students must come to that appreciation by
What a student must do is acknowledge her

ignorance in a matter when shown she cannot provide an
adequate account.

Moreover, she must be willing to pursue

the truth in the matter.

But students fail to do even this.

They are often unwilling to own up to the fact they do not
know, and when they do acknowledge their ignorance, they are
complacent with that ignorance.

They, even though they see

they do not know, feel no desire to come to know.

However,

when students make this transformation, from the teacher's
perspective, it comes ex nihilo.

That is, it seems that

there is no sufficient condition for the transformation— it
simply happens.
As a consequence, all of these essays involve a vision
of a community that encourages its members to question its
conventions and find new ways of speaking, yet also remains
true to its project of bettering and educating its members.
Even though real changes in character cannot be conditioned
sufficintly, that community provides the necessary space for
that transformation to take place.

Much of what is actually

said in these essays about such a community, however, is

vi
vague, but intentionally so.

Once such an account begins to

be explicit, it takes the form of a methodology or a set of
rules, and once this happens,* the account becomes subject to
its own criticisms— namely, that it, too, is a dogma.

What I

am trying to do with my account, then, is avoid the nostalgia
of identifying with big and captivating ideas like Reason,
Philosophy, Being, Truth, and the like, because such accounts
begin to ring hollow once they get under way.

What I can say

at most is that the education and betterment these
communities provide us is not only a healthy suspicion of
such nostalgias, but a willingness to make do with them until
we begin to bump our heads against their limits.

What we do

once we are at these limits is begin making forays into the
unknown instead of mapping its borders.
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The 'problem of the other' boils down to a simple
question: do we consider ethics to be an individual private
exercise or do we consider it to be a conversational public
exercise?

That is, when philosophers describe their

relations with others, they reveal how they see the ethical
community around them.

They reveal how they relate to that

community and its members.

They reveal in what style they

wish to enter into that community.

In this paper, I will

consider a few moments in the history of modern philosophy's
engagement with 'the problem of the other' in order to show
that philosophers have been biased toward considering ethics
more in terms of soliloquy

than dialogue.

In his

Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the
Invisible, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, although he has difficulty
overcoming the traditional model of the interiorized and
private subject because he must engage it, offers a vision of
ethics as conversation.
expanded, and tested.

This model demands to be developed,
In turn, I provide a further model

(antipodosis) for conversation wherein I try to articulate
how by giving primacy to intersubjectivity, we can develop a
new vision of ethics.

A.

A short history of 'the problem of the other'

'The problem of the other' has been one of the more
laughable topics of philosophical discussion.

Most would

4
agree that when the conversation gets to the point where it
is necessary to prove that others exist, the participants
should smile politely to each other and instead of
constructing an adequate proof, set to retracing their steps
to see where they went so awry.

This, unfortunately, has not

always been the case.

1) Descartes problematizes the other.
Descartes sets the stage for the problem of the other
specifically by the fact that he insists we know things (e.g.
his famous piece of melting

wax1) not by way of the senses

but by way of the understanding alone.

He maintains this

because he demands that we be skeptical of the res extensa in
the world (things available to perception), because they are
constantly in flux.

If these were the only things we could

know, knowledge would be impossible.

That is, if the only

ways we can know wax as wax were by way of merely perceptual
recognition, we could never be certain about what sorts of
perceptual criteria we should use— because all of wax's
qualities can change with a mere strike of a match.

But on

the other hand, when he "distinguishes the real wax from its
superficial appearances,

. . . and considers it naked, it is

certain." 2
1 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans.
Lawrence Lafleur, in Philosophical Essays (New York:
Macmillan, 1964) p. 88.
2 Ibid., p. 90.

5
Descartes similarly problematizes knowledge of others by
making the relation with an other a four-part relation:

(i)

myself as res cogitans, (ii) my body as res extensa, (iii)
the other's body as res extensa, and (iv) the other as
cogitans.

res

I am always quite sure of my self as res cogitans,

but progressively less sure of the other things in the
relation.

This situation is the genesis of the 'problem of

the other':
So I may chance look out a window and notice some
men passing in the street, at the sight of whom I
do not fail to say I see men, just as I say I see
wax; and nevertheless what do I see from this
window except hats and cloaks which might cover
ghosts or automata which move only by springs? But
I judge that they are men, solely by the faculty of
judgment which resides in my mind, that which I
believed I saw with my eyes.3
What is important here is the fact that he must judge that
these walking, talking, smiling, sniffling, and farting
entitites outside his window are people - that he must weigh
out the evidence, reflect on it, and offer a judgment.

This

situation, especially in light of Descartes' methodological
solipsism later in the Meditations, can only be mediated by
the one entity outside ourselves that we cannot doubt—
namely, God.

Since Descartes assures us that God exists and

would not deceive us, we can confidently judge the other to
exist.

2) Kant's ingenious argument
3

Ibid., p. 89, emphais mine.
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The venerable Kant also treats the 'problem of the
other' as a problem of judgment, but does not rely on God's
omniscience/omnipotence/infinite benificence to ground this
judgment.

Instead, Kant contends we can be sure of the

other's existence by the use of our own faculties of pure
reason which take the form of what we shall call the argument
by analogy.
Kant, as Descartes had before him, considered the
relation with the other to be four-part;
subject,

(i) myself as

(ii) myself as object, (iii) the other as object and

(iv) the other as subject.

From this division, Kant's

argument proceeds as such:
Pi:

P2:

Cl:

We must assign to objects, necessarily and a
priori, all the properties that constitute the
conditions under which alone we can think them
(i.e., objects must be subject to the
categories for them to be available to a
subject).
We cannot have any representation whatsoever
of a thinking being, through any outer
experience, but only through self
consciousness (i.e., subjects are never
subject to the categories— and so never
available to other subjects).

Objects of this kind (thinking things) are,
therefore, nothing more than the transference
of this consciousness of mine to other things,
which in this way alone can be represented as
thinking beings.4

Kant contends that the way thinking beings can meet the
4 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman
Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929) p. B.405
(adapted as a proof).
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conditions of P2 for us is that we have to recognize the
possibility of an existent exhibiting the properties
applicable to its subject— which depends entirely on a
transcendental employment of the understanding.

And so as it

would stand, for me to recognize an other as other would
require me to lend her my subjectivity in my own reflection
upon my relation with her.

I could only hope that she would

do the same for me— else it would end up rather degrading,
because if she did not reflectively lend me her subjectivity,
I would be no more than a talking turnip to her.
not an ideal conversational situation.

Certainly

Moreovoer, this

"reflective transference of consciousness" is still a mystery
— what exactly happens when we represent others as thinking
beings instead of merely as automata?

How, more clearly, do

we decide to go from seeing the other as object to seeing the
other as subject, and can we honestly say that this
representation of the other is any more than a construct that
I have produced all by myself?

3) Husserl and the argument by analogy
Edmund Husserl engages this question in its hardest form
xn the fxfth meditatxon of hxs Cartesian Meditations.

5

By way

of his second epoche (the transecendental reduction), Husserl
had restricted the transcendental ego "to the stream of its
5 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorian Cairns
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).
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pure conscious processes and the unities constituted by their
actualities and potentialities.

And indeed it is obvious

that such unities are inseparable from the ego and therefore
belong to its concreteness itself.'"6

Other egos, then, for me

are "merely synthetic unities of possible verification in
me," and consequently do not even count as others.

In

effect, Kant's argument by analogy has led us to a solipsism,
because the other can only be for me as a representation
created by my own self-reflection.

Husserl thinks that he

can not only salvage the other as other (as if others were
really in peril of being sucked back into his head when he
stopped reflecting on himself apprehending them as other) but
also can salvage the argument by analogy which had made the
whole situation problematic to begin with.
Husserl's second epoche is inteded to be a device by
which our own particular 'ownness' in an intersubjective
field can be investigated.

What seems to be the case at

first is that if everything is reduced to 'ownness', then the
very possibility of describing otherness is precluded.
Husserl believes it is possible to get around this
difficultly by pointing to what he calls "the noematic-ontic
mode of givenness of the other."7

He takes this givenness to

be the "transcendental clue" to unravel the mess
methodological solipsism got him into by the fact that it is
5
7

Ibid., p. 89.
Ibid., p. 90.
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not that we find the other belonging to us, as something
other constituted out of ownness, but rather as an otherness
Q

experienced as "thereness for me" in "empathy."

It is from

this lone clue that Husserl's phenomenological sleuth is to
construct a "transcendental theory of experiencing something
other."9
What the second epochs reveals as the stratum of
experience uniquely

my own is my body.

It alone is "the

only object 'in' which I 'rule and govern' immediately," and
only within it I can bring to light myself as "animate
organism (Leib) .10

Other bodies (Korper)— be they the books

in a library, the football in a major bowl game, or even the
bodies of other people— do not exhibit this unique
belongingness to me.

No matter how hard I try, they do not

do my bidding instantaneously.
manipulation.

They require some

But there is something special and uncanny

about the bodies of the third kind— the bodies of other
people.

In our particular/peculiar ways of perceiving

others' bodies, there is something extra given in their
appresentation (our representation of a body wherein we not
only are aware of the side we can see but also of what we
cannot see)— namely, the fact that they too are Leib but in a
way that the personal side of that animateness is
unavailable.
8
9
10

The other is animate in that we can engage in

Ibid., p. 92.
Ibid., p. 94.
Ibid., p. 114.
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all kinds of "harmonious behavior" that manifests itself as a
concordance of expresssions, gestures, and postures such that
we can share some realm of each others' lives.

The other's

body is "livingly present" to me.11
It is in this "community of monads" that "an intentional
communion with something else [can] exist,"12 by way of our
taking up specifically with the animate body made available
to us by our commonalities.

The last part of the analogy is

merely that we recognize that as part of our bodily existence
in relation to other bodies, our bodies will always be
"Here," and other bodies will always be "There."
Consequently, in appresentation of the other, because
animate-ness is reciprocally avalable, the other "must be
appresented as an ego now coexisting in the mode there, ‘such
as I should be if I were there.'"13

I look at the other,

then, as if I were standing inside her body— as an analogue
to my own particular ownness.
But it seems that Husserl's dressing up of the argument
by analogy does not get around the problem.

He still keeps

the situation a four-term relation in that there is:

(i) my

ego as animate body, (ii) my body as objectively present
body, (iii) the other's body as objectively present body, and
(iv) the other's ego as animate body.

Because the analogy is

the replacement of (iv) with (i) in the form of "over there",
11
12
13

Ibid., p. 112.
Ibid., p. 129.
Ibid., p. 119.
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Husserl has not made it clear how this argument by analogy
avoids the paradox (if not outright absurdity) of describing
otherness with ownness.
But these technical matters are not terribly pressing,
because what Husserl has set up is a bafflingly rigorous
description of how we appresent others to ourselves that,
even if it did work (which is dubious), no one would take the
time to actually deduce otherness for others with any
regularity, because it would be a terrible hassle.

In other

words, Husserl has given a description of how the other is
available to me, but it seems that it requires such a level
of precision and attention, I would run out of mental energy
deducing otherness from just taking a walk on a busy street.
Who would take the time to perform these elaborate mentalgymnastics every time she bumps into someone?

4)

14

Sartre and concrete relations with others
Sartre is the most vocal of the phenomenologists who

object to the unwieldiness of Husserl's laborious process of
14 In fact, this procedure begs the question: how de we know
when we've got our deductions right? How can we even go
about learning or testing the accuracy of this procedure
without others already being present to us?
Husserl had
contended that ego and alter-ego are "always and necessarily
given in an original 'pairing'," but is this all that needs
to be said?
(Cartesian Meditations,112) Why, then must
there be an argument? The very fact that Husserl does use
the argument by analogy is indicative of how his
methodological solipsism catches him in another loop— that it
chips off what it must use as a toe-hold to climb out of the
ego-well it has dug with the second epoche.

12
bringing others to 'noematic-ontic givenness.'

He contends

that Husserl's approach burdens consciousness with problems
of evidence and knowledge which deprive it of the essential
spontaneity that is revealed in investigations of
intentionality.

Sartre wants to change the topics of inquiry

from epistemological issues to ontological issues because he
recognizes that:
if the other is accessible to us only by means of the
knowledge we have of him, and if this knowledge is only
conjectural, then the existence of the other is only
conjectural....
If the body is a real object really
acting on thinking substance, the other becomes a pure
representation, whose esse is a simple percipi.15
When the connections I establish with others are construed to
be connections of knowledge, I can never escape solipsism,
because I can never prove or verify that my consciousness (as
a transcendental and constituting ego) can, in its very
being, be affected by any thing beyond the mundane (bodily)
existence of others.16
Sartre's turn to ontology in Being and Nothingness takes
the form of describing how we experience a change in the
landscape of our world when another person appears.

This

phenomenon certainly demonstrates that the other's presence
as an objectively present body (and consequently as a
conjectural entity) is not all that is really happening— that
is, "it is infinitely more probable that the passerby whom I
15 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E.
Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956) p. 305.
16 Ibid., p. 318.
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see is a man and not a perfected robot."

17

I recognize

that

the other (as other) is not simply another part of a world I
constitute for myself— rather, she is another locus or center
around which the world can be organized (and is organized).
But the most profound aspect of recognizing the other as a
presence in person is in the moment, upon the other's
appearance, of "being-seen-by-other18
The world is polarized with the other's appearance.
Everything still exists for me, but seems fixed in a flight
from me to another locus (the other), and when I recognize I
occupy a position in that same world (with my body), I
recognize that I too am in a flight to the other as a
permanent possibility.

I feel that the other can always be

looking at m e .19
The obvious question here is how does it happen?
Certainly Sartre has shown that we are affected by others as
more than their mere presence as objects, but we philosophers
want to know how it happens.

Sartre avoids the 'external' or

'cognitive' relations between ourselves and others by
claiming that the relation is "internal."20

He makes this

evident with his description of how we react to the
modification of the world (and our being) when the other
comes on the scene— we feel shame, embarrasment, anger,
17
18
19
20

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

p.
p.
p.
p.

340.
345.
345.
221.
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pride, etc.

In any one of these situations, the effect of my

world's (and my) rearrangement is that I consider myself as
an object for the other while the other is present to me as a
subject.

The other binds me to the 'facticity' of my past

and my situation such that "I am my ego for the other in the
mrdst of a world that flows toward the other."

21

Sartre

captures this feeling of being in the other's gaze (the
feeling that my being is transformed in the presence of the
other) in his famous description of the eavesdropper being
caught peeking though a keyhole:
[As I am looking through the keyhole], this situation
reflects to me at once both my facticity and my
freedom.... I cannot truly define myself as being in a
situation; first because I am not a positional
consciousness of myself; second because I am my own
nothingness... I escape provisional definitions of
myself by means of all my transcendence.22
I am engaged in the activity of looking.

I am not reflecting

upon myself as something that knows (or is to be known),
rather I am the landmark by which the world makes sense and
the spectacle behind the door is disclosed.

I exist as

myself for my pre-reflective consciousness.
But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall.
Someone is looking at me I What does this mean? It
means that I am suddenly affected in my being and
essential modifications appear in my structure modifications which I can apprehend and fix conceptually
by means of the reflective cogito.23
What makes the relation between others concrete (and i
21
22
23

Ibid., p. 380.
Ibid., p. 348.
Ibid., p. 349.
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nternal), then, is not the fact that I see others by way of
looking at myself, but that I see myself when somebody else
sees me.

It is with the presence of others that we suddenly

have our attention reflected directly upon ourselves.
But the other can be under my gaze too.

I can return

the gaze and transform the other into an in-itself, strip her
of transcendence, fix her in a situation, spatialize and
temporalize her.

Because of the nature of Sartre's

description of the 'internal relation', the other and I
maintain a mutual denial and nihilation, our relation is
fundamentally conflictual.

We find ourselves in a duel of

gazes.
The implications here are profound.

Once we come to

some connection with the other (by way of language, facial
expression, dismissive gesture, whatever), we learn what the
other thinks of us, and "this is the thing which will be able
to at once fascinate us and fill us with horror."

24

We find

ourselves offered up to the other's judgment, and in that act
of judgment we come to a determination of how we see
ourselves and in turn, act.

Whether or not we agree with the

other's judgment, the way we will carry on will be informed
by the judgment.

We confront a world organized by the other,

and we find that we are no longer masters of our own
situation— the other determines how we use our own freedom.
As a consequence, we have two choices.
24

Ibid., p. 355.

We can be:

16
a), the masochist, who causes herself to be fascinated
by herself as an object determined (in its facticity) by
the other, a being who condemns herself to trying to
annihilate her own subjectivity by causing it to be
assimilated by the other.25
or b), the sadist, who looks at the other's look and
attempts, on the ground of her own freedom, to confront
the other's freedom, who turns the gaze back on the
other such that the other cannot touch her.26
Because the other's presence reveals the being which I am
unable to either control or appropriate (since it is the
other's judgment), it is necessary for me to choose how I am
to respond, because I must respond.

"From the moment I exist

I establish a factual limit to the other's freedom,

I am

this limit, and each of my projects outline this limit around
the other," and vice versa.

27

Consequently, "respect for the

other's freedom is an empty word," because in either choice
(a) or (b), the other is a means to my end of becoming the
self that I wish to be.

28

In the case of (a), the masochist,

the other serves merely as someone who can choose my projects
for me and as the person in whom I can (for a while) situate
my responsibilities.

In the case of (b), the sadist, the

other services me as a possession whose freedom I determine.
Sartre points out that these two tactics are ultimately selfdefeating in that the masochist can never erase her freedom
by giving herself over to the other, and the sadist can never
possess the other as other, because once the other becomes a
25
26
27
28

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

p.
p.
p.
p.

493.
494.
530.
531.
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possession, she ceases to be an other.

So with each failure

of one tactic, I am motivated to adopt the other one.
Consequently, my relations with others individually may be
dialectical (as a struggle over mastership and bondage), but
my relations with others in general are circular.

29

Klaus Hartmann notes that "for Sartre, negation and
negatedness, answering to subject and object, constitute a
contradictory opposition."30

As a consequence, recognizing

myself in the other (e.g., in the argument by analogy)
requires a contradiction— that the subject be available to
itself as an object, or that in the object a subject has
access to itself qua subject.

It is in this strict

bipolarity that Hartmann situates the antagonism between
individual subjects which makes it impossible to have access
to the other as a subjectivity or even to recognize oneself
in the other.31

As a result, Sartre's description of concrete

relations with others leaves us locked up inside ourselves in
a struggle of gazes with every other person we encounter.
Moreover, since the original relationship with the other (in
general) is that of internal negation (situating an object
within a field of reference), it seems that Sartre would
contend that we could be certain of others in general, but we
have no way of being certain of individual others— we do not
29 Ibid., p. 474.
30 Klaus Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology (Evanston: Northwestern
U. Press, 1966) p.115.
31 Ibid., p. 116.
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know anything about particular others as others.
Consequently, even our most intimate relations with others
manifest the subject's antagonism for the object— "even the
beloved is a look."32

B.

Merleau - Ponty's dissolution of the problem

Accounts of otherness as a problem stem from modern
philosophy's retreat to the internality of the subject— a
retreat to the certainty available in statements about one's
own mind.

The only problem is that once we have retreated to

certainty, we are reluctant to accept anything else except
things mediated by the certain.

The result is that things,

others, and even ourselves become representations for us.
They become things we must construct.

What philosophy

becomes, then, is a very intricate talking to oneself.
Others, even in the most intense and honest joint inquiry,
love affair, or conversation, become either conjectural
'that's-what-I-would-say-were-I-over-there' entities or
entities who must be subjugated by my use of language.

1)

Breaking with the traditional model
Descartes' model for philosophy demands that the

philosopher proceed directly from the mind's interiority to
the exteriority of the world.
32

Sartre, op. cit., p. 484.

Merleau-Ponty believed it was
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necessary to reformulate the arguments and problems
promulgated by such methodologies-

In a note written a year

before his death, he outlines his revisions:
Replace the notions of concept, idea, representation
with the notions of dimensions, articulation, level,
hinges, pivots, configuration — The point of departure
= the critique of the usual conception of the thing and
its properties -> critique of the logical notion of the
subject, and of logical inference ..„.33
With this new theoretical impetus, Merleau-Ponty hoped to
develop a descriptive strategy that gives primacy neither to
the internality of consciousness nor rests on a distinction
between subject and object.

In fact, he hoped to articulate

an ontology that elaborated notions that would dissolve the
traditional tensions between subjects and objects, subjects
and subjects, humankind and humans.

The traditional

accounts make such notions their bread and butter, and in
turn, all suffer from the same problems— the problem of the
external world, the problem of the other, the problem of
individual consciousnesses.

Phenomenology, especially with

Husserl and Sartre, was an acceleration of these attitudes to
the point where they were actually starting points for
systematics (as Sartre had used the tension between subjects
as the point of departure for his description of concrete
relations with others).

Ethics, in turn, suffered from

distinct inadequacies, because its injunctions (when taken to
33 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed.
Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern
U. Press, 1968) p. 224.
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be in accord with and influenced by epistemology) were
tantamount to treating others as conjectural entities.
Descartes had insisted we not allow our wills to extend
beyond our understanding.

34

Kant's internalized subject's

criterion for proper action is that the action is out of good
will, but he admits that because the subject is interiorized,
we cannot even see good will.

35

As a result, we are unable to

get to the other about whom and for whom we are trying to
describe ethical behaviour.
Merleau-Ponty had a very different vision of how things
hang together, and he saw much of his picture nascent in
36

Husserl's description of intentionality.

Husserl had

contended that the ego does not merely think; it thinks about
something.

Consciousness is not simply consciousness; it is

consciousness of something.

Here, consciousness constitutes

a meaningful world for itself through a series of continuous
and commensurate judgments, definitions, attitudes, and
activities.

Husserl (and Merleau-Ponty) referred to this

contiguousness of intention as intentionality of act.

For

Merleau-Ponty, however, what is missing in this description
is a deeper intentionality— an intentionality of lived bodily
existence "where the world is not merely a blank slate
34 Descartes, op. cit., pp. 114-6.
35 Immanuel Kant, Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals,
trans. L.W. Beck (Saddle River, NJs Prentice Hall, 1995) p.
397.
36 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans.
Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962) p. xviii, 243.
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awaiting bestowal of significance, but already has a
distincitive physiognomy."37

He referred to deeper level of

intentionality and significance as operative intentionality.
Merleau-Ponty contends in The Phenomenology of
Perception that only by way of this broadened notion of
intentionality we can understand "the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life, being
apparent in our desires, our evaluations, and in the
landscape we see, more clearly than in objective knowledge,
and in furnishing the text which our knowledge tries to
translate into a precise language."

38

When operative

intentionality is ignored, the world only reveals itself
through a history to be reflected upon or essences to be
analyzed.

Here, in the historical-analytical reflection, our

primary encounter with the world of things (in operative
intentionality) is withheld in favor of breaking up
perception into qualities and sensations.
pre-reflective origins.

We depart from our

Here, we are tempted to think of

ourselves as subjects or transcendental unities of
apperception and the like.

As a consequence, others become

problems for us because we cannot adequately represent them
as concatenations of sensations.

But Merleau-Ponty is not

leveling a philippic against analytic reflection;
37 James Schmidt, Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Between
Phenomenology and Structuralism (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1985) p. 41.
38 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.
xviii.
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rationality, subjectivity and objectivity are not problems
for him.

39

Rather, he is reminding philosophers of their pre-

reflective origins, and by this reminder, he hopes to suggest
a new account of being-in-the-world; "true philosophy
consxsts m

re-learning to look at the world."

40

Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception is an
attempt to call attention to our existence as incarnate
subjects inhering in the world, and the crucial term for this
inherence is the body.

Merleau-Ponty introduces us to a

subjectless subject— a subject which cannot pull itself out
of the world to contemplate itself or the world in isolated
reflection.

When we look closely at objects, we find they

exist only in contextual lived realities.

These contexts are

not constituted by autonomous intellectual reflections and
judgments, but by motor responses, practical spaces and body
dynamics.

"The synthesis of the object is effected through

the synthesis of one's own body, it is the reply or
correlative to it."

41

By conceiving of my body itself as a

mobile object, I am able to interpret perceptual appearances
and construct them as they are (e.g., the apperception of all
six sides of a cube is given not because I have Euclidean
intuitions of space, but because I do things with cubes— I
roll dice, pack boxes, play 3-D Tetris).

Consequently,

neither my body nor the world my body lives in can be
39
40
41

Ibid., p. xx.
Ibid., p. xx.
Ibid., p. 205.
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comprehended in isolation.

Neither term is reducible to the

other.
As a result, personal existence is fraught with
ambiguity, uncertainty, and obscurity.

Pre-reflective

existence (that of the 'customary body' or the 'habitual
body') opens onto a realm of existence that is not
exhaustible by reflection, because it is rooted within a
motor-physiognomy that can never be wholly disclosed.

My

body's familiarity with the world goes all the way down— I
can never exfoliate my latent, tacit, bodily knowledge fully.
Even our most mundane and simple practices resist being
disclosed in their entirety; we have to live them, be trained
to act within them (e.g.. the act of kicking a soccer ball
becomes more and more difficult to describe— and the
description becomes less and less clear— as we try to
articulate the multiplicity of movements necessary for the
execution of an adequate kick, but yet we still know how to
give soccer balls good kicks without having to rely on such
runaway analysis).
Because we reside in bodies, we cannot completely
clarify our positions; we eventually have to rely on the
intutitive, practical, public self-evidence of the limits of
our accounts.

But what we take to be self-evident in these

accounts is inconstant.

It is only made constant by a

certain training or acclimation to specific situations.
Merleau-Ponty gives an example pf how we gear ourselves into
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different lighting situations:
Electric lighting, which appears yellow immediately upon
leaving the daylight, soon ceases to have any definite
color for us, and, if some remnant of daylight finds its
way into the room it is this 'objectively neutral' light
which seems to have a blue tint to it
The level is
laid down [for a particular situation], and with it all
the color values dependent on it, as soon as we begin to
live in the prevailing atmosphere and re-allot to
objects the colors of this spectrum in accordance with
the requirements of this basic convention.42
Bodily intentionality reveals how we gear ourselves into
situations, perceive and react to concatenations of objects—
we are invariably open-ended.

instead of positing a single

space as the necessary condition for objects in general (as
Kant does with the transcendental deduction of the
categories), Merleau-Ponty draws our attention to the lived
and practical spatiality which is inseverable from our
experience of qualtities as particular modes of being-in-theworld.

As Monika Langer notes, "the sensible beckons to the

incarnate subject and the latter responds by shaping
existence accordingly."

43

As a consequence of the ambiguity and opaqueness of preref lective existence, the very attempt to establish a realm
of pure thought, pure reason, or pure subjectivity as an
indubitable ground for all knowledge seems backwards (if not
outright impossible).

Such attempts to establish the

absolute interiority of the subject seem to be in defiance of
42 Ibid., p. 311.
43 Monika Langer, Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of
Perception: A Guide and Commentary (Tallahassee: Florida St.
U. Press, 1989) p. 311.
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the fact that all 'inner' states, reflective moments, and
subjective judgments are always and everywhere based in,
derived from, and reducible to pre-reflective 'outer'
states.

44

That is, for reflection to even be possible, we

must first exist as beings-in-the-worId; we must be something
to be reflected.

As a consequence, we do not reduce

existence to thoughts about existence (judgments, thetic
moments, etc.); instead, thought is re-integrated with our
total project of being-in-the-world.

2)

Dissolving 'the problem of the other'
In the chapter 'Other People and the Human World'

of The

Phenomenology of Perception, Merleay-Ponty considers "how I
experience my own cultural world, my own civilization, that
is, how other subjectivities make their appearance in
experience."

He notes that the traditional reply has been

that "I interpret their behaviour by analogy with my own,"
but I run into a serious problem - "how can the word 'I' be
put into the plural, how can a genearal idea of I be formed,
45

how can I know there are other I's?"

He

the paradox of consciousness seen from the

puts hisfingeron
outside:

If subjectivity is reduced to mind— or constituting
44 Monika Langer puts it best when she says that the
theoretical disposition to demand the interiority of the
subject "is not only an untenable position but also a
dishonest one, insofar as it always already surreptitiously
presupposes that which it attempts to deny."
(p.99)
45 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.
348.
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consciousness— then the existence of any subjectivity
other than one's own becomes utterly incomprehensible.46
If one consciousness posits other consciousnesses, it has
rendered them dependent by making their esse their percipi.
Moreover,

(and Sartre sees this too) the subject cannot even

constitute another as subject because it would be a
contradiction for the subject to make itself an object for
itself (that is, the logical notion of the subject is that it
can never be an object).

Consequently, self-perception

cannot be the starting point for an account of other minds.
(Here is where Sartre stumbles, because he contends that we
know of the other because of an internal relation we
establish with ourselves when the other comes on the scene—
that is, we know the other's awareness of us because we come
to reflect upon ourselves.)

So, "insofar as I constitute the

world, I cannot conceive another consciousness."

47

Merleau-Ponty's break with the traditional conception of
consciousness offers a way out.

Because the problem of other

minds had been generated by the model of the internal,
occult, and mysterious mind, the problem could never come to
a solution.

But Merleau-Ponty's account of consciousness is

not as a constituting consciousness, but rather:
as perceptual consciousness, as the subject of a pattern
of behaviour, as being-in-the-world or existence, for
only thus can another appear at the top of his
phenomenal body, and be endowed with a sort of
'locality'. Under these conditions the antinomies of
objective thought vanish. I discover vision, not as a
46 Langer, op. cit., p.98.
47 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.
350.
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'thinking about seeing', to use Descartes' expression,
but as a gaze at grips with a visible world, and that is
why there can be another's gaze; that expressive
insturment called a face can carry an existence, as my
own existence is carried by my body, that knowledgeacquiring apparatus.48
As a result of this turn, we do not see intentions as mental
entities independent of mechanistic bodies (as ghosts in
machines).

Rather, bodily intentionality resides in our

body's activities,

it "speaks to" other phenomenal bodies and

is comprehended by them prior to any reflection on either
side.

There is actually no need for an analogy here.

Significance for me is in fact intersubjective significance.
The other appears at the other end of interaction "as the
completion of the system."

49

That is, there is a mutual

presence of incarnate subjects which precedes any reflection,
alienation, or negation.

The system the other completes

takes the form of a cultural practice— a system of
communication where "as the parts of my body together
comprise a system, so my body and the other person's are one
whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon."50

As we

appropriate certain cultural objects and use them as others
do (that is, as we learn and master more and more expressive
mediums— from painting to skating, from writing love letters
to waving hello), we project ourselves into an environment of
interaction and communication.
Merleau-Ponty suggests that there is one particular
48
49
50

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

p. 351, emphasis mine.
p. 352.
p. 354.
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cultural object that plays a crucial role in the perception
of the other: language.

In dialogue, the other and I not

only share a common ground, but we create that common ground
together.

"My thoughts and his are interwoven into a single

fabric.... Here we have a dual being, where the other is for
me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my transcendental
field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in
commensurable reciprocity."51

As Merleau-Ponty had pointed

out earlier, the linguistic gesture delineates its own
meaning.

Words and speech are not codes for thought. "Why

should thought seek to duplicate itself or clothe itself in a
succession of utterances, if the latter do not carry and
contain within themselves their own meaning?"

52

That is,

speech possesses a power and significance of its own— thought
and expression are simultaneously constituted.
not indexical, then, it must be diacritical.

Meaning is
When I am in

dialogue with an other, we are not engaged in an exchange of
mental images mediated by a code of sounds and gestures;
instead, we are thinking out loud together.

When I am faced

with an angry or threatening gesture, I do not need to
reflect upon my compendium of past experiences with anger to
situate the angry gesture as meaning the person is angry.
do not see the anger or threatening attitude as a mental or
psychic fact behind the phenomenal gesture.
51
52

Ibid., p. 354.
Ibid., p. 182.

The angry

I
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gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger itself.
Consequently, cultural objects— the institution of language

most notably, but also music, painting, and bodily postures—
allow others to be perspicuous for me (and me for others).
But this perspicuity is not of the kind where I can see into
the other's head and see her anger.

On the contrary, because

Merleau-Ponty had insisted that language consists of use
value instead of signification, it does not matter how we
represent the other for ourselves, but how we respond to her
being angry.

"Each [gesture] by itself has no signifying

power that one can isolate, and yet, when they are joined
together in speech or, as it is called, the verbal chain,
they all make unquestionable sense."

54

.

.

.

We inhabit linguistic

spheres where words are gestures with lived value, where they
fit together with a naturalness that cannot be captured
except by those gestures in those orders.

(Merleau-Ponty

notes that the novelist, artist, and musician assemble
gestures in a similar manner— the novelist's task is to
depict inter-human events that resonate with living
. 55

meanings.)

Sartre's description of dialogue, on the other hand,
amounts to it being a continuation of conflict and reversal
53 Ibid., p. 184.
54 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Science and the Experience of
Expression," in The Prose of the World, ed. Claude Lefort,
trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Notrhtwestern U. Press, 1973)
p. 28.
55 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.
151.
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of alienation by other means.

Speaking for Sartre is another

form of seduction of the other.56

Merleau-Ponty, however,

contends that learning to speak is not simply the mastering
of a new intellectual faculty, but the acquisition of a new
and powerful capacity to live with others not as the center
of the world, but as a de-centered self— one that is in a
situation where "we encroach upon one another inasmuch as we
belong to the same cultural world, and above all to the same
language, and my acts of expression and the other's derive
from the same institution."57

In speech, we graft onto one

another such that mutual recognition need not be given
because intersubjectivity enjoys a primacy that it would make
no sense to even question.

3)

'Flesh' and the handshake
In The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty makes

it clear that it is impossible to do justice to the
phenomenon of otherness from within an ontology of
transcendentalism, subjectivism, or dialecticalism.
never describe otherness with ownness.

We can

However, he later

realized that his own account of otherness in The
Phenomenology of Perception suffered from a very serious
problem: his notion of the body leaves it entirely unclear
56 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 372-4
57 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Dialogue and the Perception of the
Other," in The Prose of the world, ed. Claude Lefort, trans
John O'Neill (Evanston: Notrhtwestern U. Press, 1973) p. 139.
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how the perceiver is simultaneously part of the percieved
world and sufficiently apart from it for a dialogue between
them to arise.

The body in The Phenomenology of Perception

was to be an incarnation of habitual pre-reflectivity.

It

functioned (as it did for Sartre as the pre-reflective
cogito) as the pole of the touchable— that to be perceived
and reflected upon.

Consciousness, on the other hand,

functions as the reflective pole, the side that gives voice
to the 'world of silence' that pre-reflective bodily
existence provides for it.

But, in The Visible and the

Invisible, Merleau-Ponty reconsiders the coherence of the
very notion of a pre-reflective cogito.

58

What I call the tacit cogito is impossible. To have the
idea of 'thinking' ..., to make the 'reduction', to
return to immanence and to consciousness of ... , it is
necessary to have words.
It is by the combination of
words ... that I form the transcendental attitude, that
I constitute the constitutive consciousness. The words
do not refer to positive significations and finally to
the flux of Erlebnisse (experiences) as Selbstgegeben
(self-evident). Mythology of a self-consciousness to
which the word 'consciousness' would refer — there are
only differences between significations.59
Pre-reflection and reflection are themselves cultural and
grammatical artifacts— it is not that the artifacts of
grammar are created by them.

So describing interaction with

the other in terms of bodily pre-reflection still falls prey
to the problem of describing othernes with ownness.

As a

consequence, Merleau-Ponty found it necessary to come up with
58 James Schmidt, op.cit., p. 94.
59 Maurice Mereau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p.
171, emphasis mine.
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a new description of how we can both touch and be touched
without having recourse to the notion of the body as a preref lective cogito.

That is, he must describe a neutral

medium in which ownness and otherness can meet without
contradiction.
In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty uses the
notion of 'flesh' as a 'prototype of being', a mediator
between the body as being a part of and the body as being
apart from the world.

Vision adheres to the visible,

perception adheres to the perceptible. It is the eye that
sees, not the soul.
reversible.

We, as seers, are visibles— we are

"It is that the thickness of the flesh between

seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its
visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an
60

obstacle between them, xt xs thexr means of communxcatxon."
Flesh exists as the synergy between the seer and the seen,

but it itself remains unseen— it must remain the other side,
the obverse, of sensible being.

By way of the flesh, we can

overcome the paradox of difference and sameness, self and
other, ipseity and alterity.

That is, any account of the

other or the object must include a mixing of identity with
difference— difference, because the other must be genuinely
other (not me); and identity, because the other must be
disclosed as something that I can recognize as analogous to

60

Ibid., p. 135.
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myself.

61

Flesh provides the common ground where the other

and I can reach each other— where I can see and be seen— but
also where we can be opaque to each other to maintain our
specific identities.
this ground.

62

Otherness must be discovered within

The other must make herself known to me (as the

paradoxically same and different).

If the other is a meaning

or significance I can project upon some discernable body,
then that body is not truly another's, I would manufacture
the other.63
What Merleau-Ponty's idea of 'flesh' boils down to
is a question of mediation.

Flesh is the "third thing" in

the subject-object and subject-subject dialectic.
Traditionally, it was thought that for such a dialectic to
get under way, the third entity in mediation must originate
from one of the two poles in the dialectic.

However, when we

actually go about describing how the subject goes about
producing the mediator, we fall into idealism (or
intellectualism), where everything is reducible to "ownness."
61 Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories is an
attempt to do this very thing, but with objects in general.
The schemata were to be the mediators between the subject and
the object - in that the categories were to be indicative of
'belongingness to the subject' and their 'reference' were to
be indicative of their difference. This, of course, does not
work, because reference cannot be given but by way of another
superaddition of the categories to a judgment. As a
consequence, Kant's critical philosophy spawned a
proliferation of what can be called 'internal philosophy'.
62 M. C. Dillon, "Ecart: Reply to Lefort's 'Flesh and
Otherness'," in Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, ed.
Galen Johnson and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern U.
Press, 1990) p. 16.
63 Ibid., p. 17.
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On the other hand, when the object is the source of
mediation, the subject has no ownness— no pattern is more
recognizable than any other.

64

The way "flesh" works

mediately, then, is in no such manner.

It itself is

anonymous— neither bearing the stamp of the subject nor of
the object.

Merleau-Ponty's objection to the dialectical

dogma of mediation springing from the poles is that for the
relations between the poles to even be possible, it must
already be established.65

The object, then, is not

constructed, intuited, or represented in the subject but is
discovered in a neutral space.
The question still remains: what exactly happens when
we discover otherness?
model of reversability:

Merleau-Ponty provides an example - a
the handshake.

Flesh is the medium

of reversability— the third term in the doubling back of the
relation between the touching hand and the touched hand.

The

body is capable of seeing, touching, and hearing itself, and
in fact, the gaze can detatch from the subject and turn back
upon itself as if it came out of the things seen.66

So, in

the handshake, "I can feel myself touched as well and at the
same time as touching"— there is no problem with the alter
64 Cf. Merleau-Ponty's description of the inadequacy of
intellectualist and physiologist descriptions of sensation in
Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 3-25.
65 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, pp.
77,87,93.
66 Claude Lefort, "Flesh and Otherness," in Ontology and
Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, ed. Galen Johnson and Michael B.
Smith (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1990) p. 7.

because it is not I who sees (touches), not he who sees
(touches) because an anonymous visibility (touchability)
inhabits us both in virtue of that primordial property
that belongs to the flesh, being here and now, of
radiating everywhere and forever, being an individual,
of being a dimension and a universal.67
In the circle of the touched and the touching, the touched
takes hold of the touching— the touched inscribes itself in
the touching.

68

When we see other people, we do not look at

them with pupil-less eyes; we designate our place among
others as a visible, with seeable eyes.

It is here that I

understand the other's transcendence— not because I grasp the
other as a transcendent entity (as a subject, consciousness,
mind, res cogitans, whatever), but because the other and I
dance around the flesh.

Instead of an abyss that separates

us, a joining of two sides of a dance links us.
be "abstracts from one sole tissue."69

We must both

Our relationship is

not that of two contradictories (as with a dialectic), but
rather as two entries into the same being, two different
moments in the same syntax, reverses of each other.
Of course I can never have the other's experiences, but
this does not put us at odds— nor does that make her
7Q

inaccessable.

This non-coincidence is manifest even xn the

non-coincidence of touching and touched.

That is, the

touched can never touch the touching, but it does bind it,
67
142
68
69
70

Maurice Mereau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p.
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inscribe itself in it.
problem.

What the touching is, then, is not a

What the other is, then, is not a problem.

Claude Lefort criticizes Merleau-Ponty for insisting
that the phenomenon of reversibility discloses otherness.
Lefort contends that by doing so, Merleau-Ponty ignores the
irreducibility of otherness.

71

But as both M.C. Dillon and

Gary Brent Madison contend in their responses to Lefort's
essay, Merleau-Ponty's use of the notion of 'flesh' allows
for otherness to remain irreducible, but no longer
mysterious.

Madison contends that flesh allows the subject

to be for itself an other, but as Dillon anticipates (and as
I have shown earlier), this does not allow the other to be
discovered.

For Madison, the other would be merely another

production were this so.

That is, Madison's account of how

otherness is available is that it is an "internal
phenomenon," but he insists that it is not an "internal
projection."

Instead, he contends that "when I engage in

reflection, I am already for myself an other.
this, otherness is inscribed in my very flesh."

Because of
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However,

Madison's account seems to work in denial of the facts that
71 (Lefort, op. cit., p.8) Lefort also criticizes MerleauPonty for not having made it clear how cultural practices
come about - that the Being Merleau-Ponty actually
investigated was not that wild experience he had hoped to
give expression, but was already domesticated for him (p.11).
However, this issue goes too far afield for the purposes of
this essay.
72 Gary Brent Madison, "Flesh as Otherness," printed in
Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty. ed. Galen Johnson and
Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1990) p.
33.
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Merleau-Ponty had pointed out that: (1) 'other within the
self' maneouvres are commensurate with the pre-reflective
cogito, which he had repudiated, and (2) any account of
otherness that is derived internally is nothing more than a
dressing up of the argument by analogy.

C.

Conversational ethics

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology discloses how we are
geared into a bodily order (logos) which is already
intersubjective, already informed by mutual recognitions.

As

a consequence, we can appreciate the otherness of the other
with more acuity.

We can articulate and explore the

ambiguities of our relations with others— not so that they
will suddenly become unambiguous but so that we can be more
sensitive to and cognizant of the necessity for ambiguity and
reversability in our relations with others.

As David Michael

Levin notes, here, in these hinges of relations with others,
in "the intertwinings, transpositions, and reversabilities
taking place in the dimension of our intercorporeality...,
the body's deeply felt sense of justice [is brought to
73

light ] ."

What philosophers should do now that our

discussions of relations between ourselves and others can be
informed by Merleau-Ponty's new model is make use of it in
73 David Michael Levin, "Justice in the Flesh," in Ontology
and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, ed. Galen Johnson and Michael
B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1990) p. 35.
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new situations, investigate what might be disclosed about an
ethics that works silently between our bodies.
Our sense of justice is deeply rooted, firmly grounded
in the body of our experience. There is a preliminary
sense of justice already schematized in and by the
flesh: this sense is a political ideality, a logos,
which gives the flesh its ethical and political axis;
its sense is an implicit logos which already lays down,
for our intercorporeality, a direction for further
exertions, and gathers us into forms of communication by
which we can extend its enlightening rule.74
Levin suggests that we ask the question: what kind of society
do our bodies require?
the order of our bodies

He suggests that "given the fact that
is an order structured by

reversibility, what the body needs for its fulfillment is a
social order governed by instituitions of reciprocity."75

In

fact, many of the current (instead of ideal as Levin
suggests) social institutions can be described in terms of
bodily relations.76

My project in this paper is not nearly as

ambitious, but is of importance.

I intend to use Merleau-

Ponty' s model of the reversability of the handshake to inform
a description of how we maintain the informal institution of
the personal relationship— how we get along as individuals.
It only makes sense that a new ethics should be brought about
when a new ontology has been articulated.
Because "flesh" exists as an anonymous mediation between
74 Ibid., p. 43.
75 Maurice Mereau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p.
43.
76 Deleuze and Guattari's parallels between capitalist
production and bodily (both erotic and ergonomic) production
is the most obvious example.
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subjects, an account of how subjects get along should take
account of this anonymity's influence on how those subjects
make rules for their interaction.

That is, because

traditional theories of ethics have relied on the mediation
coming from either the subject or the object, they make
injunctions about what kind of rules should be made.

But

once we recognize that we encounter others in a world
constituted by neither of us, we see from where our moral
intuitions arise.

That is, our utopian visions, moral fibre,

ethical hope, and appreciation for the virtues are informed
by moments we have with others that are not constructed with
rules and principles but ones where we come together
spontaneously.

1)

Imperativity, interrogativity, and reciprocity
The point of coming into contact with another person—

whether it be a stranger who sits next to me on the bus or a
good friend who just has entered the room— is the point where
I come into communication with that other person.
expressive space.

We open an

In the case of the stranger on the bus, I

at least make some sort of gesture that acknowledges her
presence— I move over to give her some space to sit; I may
make some sort of greeting nod.

These gestures are not

necessary (in that they are not the only communicative
gestures that can be used), but some gesture is necessary.
Even refusing to make a greeting gesture (i.e., not even
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acknowledging the other person sitting right next to me) is a
gesture in that it speaks to the other person— it tells her
that I refuse to even acknowledge her (isn't that enough?).
In this case, she can either comply (she can ignore me too,
and we can be in agreement), or she can respond by trying
harder to engage me— which usually leads to some dismissive
gesture on my part or an outright rebuff.

Either way, I set

the tone for the expressive space between us.

We don't have

to speak, but the longer the trip, the more uneasy we become
with the silence.77

In the case of my friend coming into the

room, we greet each other with each other's names, maybe a
pat on the back, or an exchange of familiar expressions.

We

allow conversation to flow; our posture is toward one another
such that we can pick up on how the other is reacting; we
explore each other's affectations.

At some time, I may

happen upon my friend when she is distraught or angry, and I
can only respond by listening to her, by trying to comfort
her, or trying to take her side— there is no letting the
conversation flow where it may here.
What these examples ammount to is this:

when we enter

into communication with others, we make gestures of opening
the expressive space such that we can either come into a
77 I once sat next to a woman on a plane from Detroit to San
Fransisco for 5 hours. She refused even to look at me for
the entire trip, and it began to bother me, because it
required such a concerted effort on her part not even to
respond to the most basic of overtures - looking at me, the
obligatory smile, sitting in her seat like there was some one
sitting next to her, etc.
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dialogue of determining what or how to communicate, or one of
us makes a demand that the communicative space be a certain
way.

The person who refuses to speak to me on the bus and

the distraught friend make imperative gestures to me— they
alone determine the mood of the communication, the topic of
discourse, our project together (even if it is the absence of
a project as it is when I am rude to the woman on the bus).
The person who responds to my presence on the bus and the
friend who is open to conversation with me (be it idle talk
or dialogue) make interrogative gestures to me— they open the
expressive space such that we can decide together what the
topic of conversation and the mood of the communication will
be.

We treat each other as the ends of the communication—

not the extraction or exchange of information, expression of
some feeling, or sense of satisfaction from having
accomplished something.
The response to the imperative gesture is contained in
the imperative gesture itself.

The other's behaviour in

response to the gesture is preordained by the gesture; that
is, the other either complies or rejects entering into the
communicative space altogether.

In either case, both parties

have their roles unambiguously determined until the project
is brought to fruition.
other.

Both parties crystalize for each

The one who makes the demand polices the interaction;

she makes sure we do not change the topic of conversation
until she is satisfied.

In the case of the silent stranger
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on the bus, my compliance is that I do not open some
communicative space, but our proximity on the bus (the fact
that we sit right next to each other) requires that I
continually re-comply (that is, any moment my eyes drift near
her or when a bump knocks our shoulders together requires
that I again comply with her demand that we not enter into
any more communication than our agreement not to
communicate).

In the case of my distraught friend, my

compliance is my reacting with sympathy, lending her my ear,
letting her vent until she feels better, or at least until
she wears herself out.

My rejection would take the form of

changing the subject (another imperative gesture, saying
generally 'I don't want to talk about that, but this,
however, I will talk about') or of refusing to be
sympathetic, refusing to allow her to expect me to react in
any manner.

In any of these cases, my intentional field (my

choices for action) is restricted; I must react to the
imperative gesture in certain ways— someone else situates me
in a certain syntax.
In any of these cases, the person making the imperative
gesture demands that I fulfill her expectations, play a
certain structured role for her, do what is appropriate, and
it is in this demand that I become distanced from the other.
Not because I am alienated by the fact that I have something
forced upon me (although this does happen, it is not the
ontologically distancing aspect of this gesture).

Instead, I
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am distanced from the other because the other demands that we
step into a structure that generalizes me, that makes me into
a service-provider, something that makes me merely something
useful, a means.

In the imperative mood, I say 'I want to be

X, and you must be my Y.' And as a Y, the other's richness
and thickness is exchanged for a thinness— a Y-ness to my Xness.

The other is not allowed to choose which structure we

will inhabit together.

In fact, when the relation between

the other and me is in the imperative mood, the other's (and
my) identity is more of an obstruction than an assistance to
the perpetuation of the structures of the relation.

That is,

the other can only know me as a generality, an abstraction, a
person that services to fill one of her lacunae.
Professionalism as a mode of sociability is an excellent
example of how the other is kept at a safe distance— she is
generalized and compartmentalized.

As professionals we treat

clients a certain way, colleagues a certain way, secretaries
and office help a certain way....
The interrogative gesture opens an indefinite field of
expression for the other.
other.

Nothing is predetermined for the

In the case of the stranger on the bus, her gesture

of greeting opens a space where I can choose any direction—
where I am allowed to explore.
that she sees how I explore.

She too explores— by the fact
In the case of the friend who

comes into the room, our conversation manifests itself as a
playfulness— we disclose affectations, interrogations,

gambits.
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But a problem analogous to the problem of generality
with the imperative mood surfaces for the interrogative mood.
Couples who have just started to see each other often find
themselves at a point where they go round and round with the
question: "what do you want to do?" "well, what do you want
to do?" They awkwardly attempt to avoid any imposition on the
other.

That is, in the interrogative mood, we may maintain

our dignity as self-determining agents, but there is no
structure for us to be agents in at all. There is nothing to
determine.
At some point, we have to make a decision.

We have to

have a project, we have to have something to talk about or
some way of interacting.

However, it is not that we come to

these moments as transcendental, contextless intellects such
that we would not have any impetus to choose one direction or
framework over another.

We are not Buridan's asses forever

caught between water and food unable to make a decision which
to have first.

We are embodied consciousnesses with desires,

agendas, and predilections that situate us such that when we
come upon an other, we come upon that other with a mood, a
disposition, a project.

We are always and already involved.

(This is what Merleau-Ponty reveals with his description of
operative intentionality.)

As a consequence, when the other

comes on the scene, she comes on as either something relevant
to the project at hand or as an opportunity to begin a new
project.

While I am reading in my room, a knock may come at
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my door.

I answer the door and find my friend has come over

to chat.

She and her chat are distactions to my project of

reading, I may ask her to leave because I have to read, or I
may invite her in and take a break from my reading.

While I

am walking to a restaurant, I may be thinking about a certain
television show when I bump into someone.

I can tell her

that I am on the way to dinner and cannot stop to talk, or I
can invite her to comment on the television show.
What is at issue here is the fact that because we enter
into relations with others out of projects and contexts that
extend beyond our moment with the other, we find that we are
led to determinations of the expressive space we have with
the other.

We have things to do, and every time others step

onto the scene, their presence is seen against that
background.
Reciprocity is the recognition of the fact that at some
times some people must, because they have pressing
circumstances and because something must be decided in order
for us to even have an expressive medium, make determinations
upon what kind of expressive medium we will use and what our
project will be.

We recognize that someone has to make a

decision at some point in time, and we, out of that
recognition, can see how such a decision fits in with the
other's project— not as a general other, but as a specific
other.

That is, when I meet up with the other, she appears

to me not as a reflection of myself upon myself (as she would
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for Sartre or any of those who use the argument by analogy),
because she appears as a singular other with her own style of
being— her own posture, her own way of putting things.

Were

others to appear solely as analogies to myself, they would
have no distinctness, no identity beside the functions they
serve in my

life.

However, when we recognize the other's

mood, certain nuances in how she articulates her
determinations of the expressive space, we see
project fits with her life.
other people.

We can

how our

see how wefitin with

Just by a waiter's body language and pitch of

voice, I can tell whether or not he is being funny

or nice to

me simply because he wants a tip or because hegenuinely
likes chatting with customers.

I can tell whether or not I

am interrupting something important when I walk into a room
by how people are sitting in their chairs, look at me, or
respond to my overtures to engage in conversation.

As a

consequence, we decide to either play along with the other's
project or withdraw from the project altogether.
ignore fake waiters.

I can

I can leave meetings that have nothing

to do with me.
Reciprocity, then, manifests itself as indulgence,
broad-mindedness, and charity.
important to other people.

We know certain things are

They make certain demands upon

us, and when the demands are not outrageous, we comply— we go
along.

The distraught friend needs to be comforted, so I do

my best to comfort her.

The lady on the bus wants to be left
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alone, so I leave her alone.

The friend who drops by my

house while I am reading wants to talk, so I may chat with
her.

The point is, when we make determinations of expressive

spaces, we show each other what kind of life we want to live-what things are important to us.

2)

Overruning the other
The danger, though, is the fact that our own agendas can

obscure the other's gestures toward us.

That is, because the

other steps on a scene already colored by our own desires,
her desires can be considered to be beside the point.
Moreover, if the other gestures in the interrogative mood or
allows me to regularly determine the expressive space, I am
given free reign to determine the practice at hand however I
like.

This leads to tyranny.
Let us say I am in a bar with a friend of mine.

We

belly up to the bar to order our drinks when she asks me what
I will be having.
X.

I say I think that I will have a bottle of

Oh no, not X, she says.

better drink.
about her day.

So I order Y.

You should have Y.
We get a table.

It's a much
I ask her

She tells me about her day and then suggests

we talk about a certain book.

I may have no opinion on the

matter, so she proceeds to tell me what she thinks about the
book.

Later in the evening, I try to change the subject or

tell her about my day.

She seems uninterested; she looks

around the bar or stares back at me glazed-eyed.

I return to

48
asking her what she wants to do or talk about, and she perks
right up.
What this example is supposed to elucidate is how we can
be tempted to react to the fact that others, even though
their projects do not overlap with ours, defer to our
projects; we can become self-centered, self-serving.

What

makes this situation possible is reciprocal practice— that
is, when others go along with our demands out of deference to
our style of life, we are tempted to think our style of life
the only one that counts.

The child who has tolerant parents

(ones who listen attentively to everyting the child says,
indulge the child's wishes, and make attempts to defer to the
child's determinations) ususally comes out terribly spoiled
instead of learning to be tolerant by the parents' examples.
The same happens in everyday interaction— those who make
demands in groups of tolerant people become more demanding
than tolerant.

Reciprocity begins to break down, because it

makes room for tyranny. In reciprocity, we make room for
ourselves to be overrun.
Playing opposite the tyrant has its stresses and
strains.
worth it.

At some point in time, we ask ourselves if it is
At some point in my night out at the bar with my

bossy friend, I ask myself whether or not I am going to
continue to tolerate being overrun.

I decide either to

assert myself by making a demand on the tyrannical other or
point out the fact that she does not listen to me, or I play
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the martyr and continue to be overrun.
In the case of making a demand upon the tyrannical
other, I try to usurp her position.
her own medicine.
confrontational.

I give her a taste of

I demand that I be heard.

I may be

I may tell her that her stories are boring

and her drink choice is terrible.

In any case, I make

drastic determinations on how we interact, I call attention
to myself and my dissatisfaction with how she is running our
conversation.

But in the case of playing the martyr, I

resolve myself to deferring to the other's determinations and
decisions.

But I make this resignation, not out of finding

that I cannot overcome her tyrany (even though I actually may
not be able to), but because I see my resignation as a noble
sacrifice — one in the name of reciprocity's tolerance.

In

turn, I make gestures to call attention to my compliance with
the other's wishes regardless of my own wishes.

I may evoke

some thin earnestness when listening to her stories or make
weak protestations before submitting to her will in the end.
I try to make my going-along appear to be a sacrifice.

I

work to make the tyrant feel guilty for forcing me to do her
bidding.
The problem with either of these reactions to tyrany is
the fact that both perpetuate tyranny.

The first— usurping

the tyrant— leads to a struggle of wills.

In the end,

neither individual will be able to even stand being around
the other.

The second— playing the martyr— does nothing more
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than call attention to the tyrany by giving into it.

Even

though the tyrant may feel guilty (which is not even
guaranteed since the tyrant must first be acquainted with
reciprocity for her to feel guilt over not enacting it), she
does not necessarily have to stop being a tyrant.

In fact,

feeling guilty about being a tyrant would be one more topic
of conversation for her to monopolize and control.

3) Antipodosis
The mark of reciprocity is the fact that it is a
measured fairness. Each member of a conversation is allowed
to run things for a while.

Sometimes members exploit each

other in the relationship, but such moments are few and far
between and reparations are made once all members of the
community are properly trained.

That is, reciprocity is a

state of relation between two people that must be tended,
pruned, and weighed out.
current project i s .

We take turns determining what the

We make exchanges— I will go to the

opera one night with my fiance, and she agrees to come to the
truck and tractor pull the next night.

In this respect,

reciprocity is primarily prudential in nature— i.e., we make
beneficent gestures in order to receive them.

Reciprocity

only seems broken in a relationship when I do not receive
what I want from the other members.
However, our relations with others do not have to always
be dialogical.

That is, in the imperative-interrogative mood
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distinction, the tyrant-martyr coupling, and the circularity
of reciprocity, our relationship with the other remains tied
to the bipolarity of the subject and object. That is, in
each, one member determines the project and the other either
goes along or challenges the determination.

But Merleau-

\

Ponty had demonstrated that such bipolarity is not necessary.
In the handshake, we encounter others not as objects or
subjects but as a discovered otherness, an immanent
transcendence, a feeling and felt hand.

But what is this

like in a continuous relationship with an other?
I am dribbling the ball in a soccer game.
ball forward into an open space.

I push the

Suddenly, one of my

teammates runs behind a defender and waves her hand to draw
my attention.

Our eyes lock, and I pass the ball.

dribbles downfield.

She

I pass the ball not because she and I

have an agreement that she will pass me the ball in the
future.

I don't pass her the ball because good passing is a

means to the end being a winning goal.
because it fits.

J pass her the ball

We may be joined together in a project with

some definite end, but my motivation is more aesthetic than
teleological.

For a moment in our purposeful and

deliberative machinations, we are spontaneous.
As with the handshake, neither is wholly in control of
the situation.

We both make our own contributions, but we do

not obscure each other.
other and she for me.

I am both subject and object for the
In this shared space, neither of us is
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the center of the practice.

Rather, we graft onto one

another in a neutral medium.

Neither of us decides the ball

has to be passed - we both act in such a way that it is.

It

is here that determination is beside the point— control of
the situation falls from one person to the other, but we do
not have to be usurping the role of the tyrant or dutifully
allowing each other to control the course of events for a
while.

Instead, control remains anonymous.

With the tyrant-

martyr pairing and the reciprocal circle, control is never
ambiguous at any moment.

We set up a rules (explicitly or

implicitly) for interaction, and never is it even a question
who is in control.

But when Ipass the ball

to my teammate

racing down the field, it is never clear who is in control.
Is she the one who demands the

ball with her urgent hand

waving and determined run?

I the onewho makes the

Am

determination by gracing her with the ball?

We can't say.

In the handshake, too, it is ambiguous who is touching and
who is being touched.
This anonymous control remains between the other and
myself.

It never congeals on either of u s .

It is like a

hopping from foot to foot, not quite running, not quite
standing, not quite staying still - it is antipodosis.
we find rapport with our friends.
our lovers.

Here,

Here we find romance with

We are not measuring out who gets to decide

what, but acting harmoniously.
When I see ,my friend, she is not a reflective analogue
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to my subjectivity.

That is, I do not have to analogize her

with myself to understand how to interact with her, which is
what most bipolar theories of ethics would suggest.

I do not

have to ask myself how I would want me to treat her were I
her.

When I begin to think that way, everything I do seems

forced.

I would not be able to joke with her.

I would not

be able to strike upon any natural rhythm with her.

Here

would be where we would have to begin to make rules for
interaction with each other.

But when I normally come upon

my friend, I know how to interact with her.

I may not be

able to articlate or bring to light all the rules for our
interaction (there may not even be any rules for all our
exchanges), but when we involve ourselves in a project
together, things seems to fall into place.

We gear ourselves

into each other.
The same with my lover.

When our bedroom involvement

becomes rule-bound as reciprocity would dictate (such that if
I do X for her, then she will do Y for me), our lovemaking
takes on the hue of an exchange economy.
reduce to sexual opportunism.

Our relations

But when we are caught up with

each other, when we have nothing more at stake than being
with each other, when neither one of us dictates what goes
on, we interact antipodetically.
So the problem is that with reciprocity (and other forms
of dialogical relations with others), we remain distant from
the other.

The syntax of exchange of goods and services
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takes the place of possible communication and rapport.

The

other and I remain generalizations in an unambiguous
structure.

We do business.

Traditional (rule-based) ethics

work relatively well here, but when the situation gets
smaller and more ambiguous, traditional ethics has nothing
more to say.

How would we run my passing in a soccer game

through the Categorical Imperative?

So the question still

remains, how do we get along on a day-to-day basis?

How I

may pass the soccer ball in a game may have no real moral
import, but it does reflect how I get along with the others
around me.

(Moreover, most diehard soccer fans would contend

that an unwillingness to pass the ball is indicative of
severe moral deviancy.)
What this discussion ammounts to, then, is a description
of certain situations in which we fall into a rapport with
others— where we get along without the strictures of ruleboundedness.

These moments are the moments that inform our

moral intuitions— they are moments reciprocity constantly
tries to re-attain.

In no way then, is reciprocity any less

morally worthy or actually good.

What it is is derivative,

and the same can be said for any system of rules governing
behavior.

Antipodosis, then, is a certain structural moment

that resists structural description, because we are acting
spontaneously and without rule-determinations.

Wittgenstein's

Two Senses of
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'Understanding'
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I. Meaning, use, understanding, and being able to go on.
Wittgenstein contends in his later work that language is a
field of related activities, each with its own style.

These

activities, like commanding, chatting, questioning, counting,
and reciting, are each integral parts of (and compliments to)
other non-speaking activities like walking, drinking, eating,
and playing.1

In light of this contention, words have certain

meanings because they are used in certain public and
conventional situations.

A sense of propriety goes along

with conventions, and meaning lies within the realm of how
certain activities in certain situations are related to (or
bear some resemblance to) what is appropriate to those
situations.

The meanings of words are the conventional roles

the words play in a language.
When we understand, we do not do anything extra-linguistic.
To understand is not to grasp some non-linguistic object by
decoding linguistic signs.

Instead, understanding is a

technique of seeing how certain utterances or activities are
appropriate (either with relation to other utterances or to
certain situations) and, in turn, responding appropriately.
For instance, if I were to say to someone "Get me a glass of
water,"

I would know the person has understood by her

response. Either she would say "O.K." and get me a glass of
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosphical Investigations, trans.
G.E.M. Anscombe (Englewood Cliffs: Harper and Row, 1958)
section 25.
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water, or refuse to do so by saying something to the effect
"Get your own."

Complimentarily, we would not say she

understands if she takes off her shoe and tosses it through a
window, invades Poland, or makes some sort of gesture we have
never seen before.

So, the relationship between a command

and a response is always one of convention of what is linked
to what.

The criterion for whether or not someone has

understood is not, then, what picture she has in her mind
when a command is

made, but how she behaves after the

command.

say someone understands addition, we expect

When we

her to be able to

do addition.

When we say someone

understands a series, we expect him to be able to complete
the series.

2

We expect people who we say understand to be

able to go on— to respond in some manner that is
conventionally appropriate.

3

This account of meaning and understanding in terms of
and being able to

use

go on stands distinct from common

misconceptions of meaning and understanding - those in terms
of grasping a rule.
amount to this:

In a nutshell, these misconceptions

meaning is determined by rules, and when we

understand we grasp those rules.

Wittgenstein's discussion

of rules in sections 143 through 242 of the Philosophical
Investigations shows how these misconceptions are incomplete
as descriptions of how we understand.

His first counter to

2 Cf. PI.143.
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, (New York:
Harper and Row, 1960) p.132.

58
the rule-oriented misconception is that the rules for the
practice will never exhaust the practice.

In fact, knowing

how to play a game may never involve learning the rules to
the game.

Wittgenstein suggests we imagine learning how to

play chess without having been told the rules but by watching
the game being played.

4

Moreover, when we are presented with

a set of rules for a practice, we have to interpret them in
order to understand the practice.

Unless there are rules for

interpreting rules (and rules for those rules ad infinitum),
we have to interpret the rules (and act) without
justification.5

As a consequence, if rules were the

determining factors for meaning and use, we would have a
paradox, because "no course of action could be determined by
a rule, because every course of action can be made out in
accord with the rule."6

But Wittgenstein shows the way out:

"following a rule is analogous to obeying an order.

We are

trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way."7
That is, the regularity of rules' application is contingent
on the regularity of technique of obeying the rule.

The

practice being described by the rules, then, must be
logically prior to its rules (and not the other way around),
because without the regular techniques of applying the
practice's rules, the rules would not be able to say
4
5
6
7

B B .13.
Cf. PI.217, 219.
PI.201.
PI.206.
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anything.
Wittgenstein's second counter to the rule-oriented
misconception is that because rules are public entities, it
is impossible to follow a rule privately (or follow a rule in
one's head).

Following a rule is a public practice.

As a

consequence, to understand an utterance, just grasping

(by

having a certain picture in one's head) the rules for its
meaning is not enough - because there is no public criterion
for that understanding.

Understanding must be public, and it

must be in the form of going on.

And this going on - when we

understand - accords with the rules of the practice, but is
not determined by them.
usage.

That is, rules allow and disallow

They do not determine usage.

Consequently, they do

not help us understand a sentence's meaning, because they do
not say anything that might reveal anything more than whether
the usage is or is not allowed.

II. The Two Senses of "Understanding"
In sections 531-533 of the Philosophical Investigations,
Wittgenstein is concerned with two senses of "understanding"
which may be called: (1) paraphrastic understanding and (2)
poetic or intransitive understanding.
We speak of understanding a sentence in the
sense in which it can be replaced by another which
says the same; but also in the sense in which it
8

PI.202.
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cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one
musical theme can be replaced by another.)
In one case the thought in the sentence is
something common to different sentences; in the
other, something is expressed only by these words
in these positions. (Understanding a poem)9
(1)

In the first sense, "understanding" means the ability

to replace one sentence with another which says the same
thing. It is paraphrasing.

Conventionally, the ability to

paraphrase a sentence is considered a worthy indicator of
understanding— it is a

mastery of a technique of expression.

Paraphrasing demonstrates a familiarity with the varieties of
ways one sense can be constructed within the rules of a
language— like knowing all the different tools that can be
used to do the same thing.

(Consider the way that a common

simple sentence such as "I'm tired" can be paraphrased with
"I'm beat" or "I'm worn out" - or more tellingly, how many
different ways a sportscaster can say one team beat another.)
What is implicit in paraphrastic understanding is a
reduplication of a sentence's use in a language-game.
a language L, if a sentence

So, in

with sense (use) s is replaced

with sentence S 2 , the criterion for determining whether S 2 is
being used successfully as paraphrasis is its relation to s
(whether or not s can be S 2 's use) and not to S]_.

That is,

the criterion is in terms of the commensurability of Si'S and
S 2 's range of use— the criterion is the "thought of the

9

PI.531.
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sentence [that] is ... common to different sentences."10 That
"thought" is the use to which the sentences are put, and the
sameness of that use is nothing other than how the sentence
affects the rest of the language game in which it is being
used.

If the practice continues no differently than before,

then the paraphrasis is successful; if not, then the meaning
is changed.
The way paraphrasis is achieved, though, is by comparing
the effect

and S 2 respectively have on the language-game.

Since s (the use) does not exist independently of them, there
is no pre-existent set of ideas or senses to which these
sentences are to correspond.

By this, the relation between

Si and S 2 is not arrived at by way of sense as an
intermediary (like a third man), but by way of sense as the
respective sentences' shared place in a language L . Put
simply, a sentence's sense does not exist independently of
its use (since its sense is its use), and its use cannot
exist independently of the sentence— as if one could
"airball" or "brick" without basketball talk.
Paraphrastic understanding has one particularly
obvious usage: to demonstrate the use of a sentence in a
language game by replacing it with another sentence with the
same use.

Paraphrasis can be used for clarification. Usually

this practice designates a certain sense s which
10

PI. 531, emphasis mine.

might not
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unambiguously have in that context, but S 2 does (or at least
if S 2 is also ambiguous, they share s as one of many uses).
S 2 clarifies the way

is being used.

This is how we would

explain how the farmer who fed dollar bills to her cows so
that they would have rich milk erred.
Paraphrastic understanding also draws attention to the
structure of the language game that the sentences are in.
Paraphrasis gives a road map of the language game— the
different ways of getting to the same place.
the practice speaks for itself.
roads come to light.

in paraphrasis,

The practice's well worn

Its conventions and ingrained ways of

doing the same things become clear.

Remember that sports

caster with all the ways of saying one team beat another?
The problem is that clarification is often confused with
explanation— demonstrating the sense of a sentence in one
language game Ll by replacing it with a sentence with an
analogous sense in another language game L 2 .

Explanation

consists of a comparison of syntactical relations in the
analogous uses in the language games.

So, "in order to

'explain' [a musical piece] I could only compare it with
something else which has the same rhythm (I mean same
pattern)."11

Explanation takes the form of translation -

taking an obscure or unfamiliar expression and replacing it
with one that is familiar.
11

PI.527.

In the case of some unfamiliar
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expression

(an expression in an unfamiliar language-game)

which would "look like implements, but I don't know their
use,"12 the replacement expression S2 explains Si's use with
its own use in L2.

This works well sometimes, because

translation points out and works from similarities between
language games, and many language games have extensive
similarities.

The practices that surround the use of color-

words in Indo-European languages is an adequate example, and
even a discussion of offensive tactics in soccer can be
translated into hockey-talk. So what distinguishes
paraphrastic understanding (clarification) from explanation
(translation) is the language game of which the replacement
sentence is a part.

Paraphrasis stays within the original

language game, and explanation goes outside of it.
(2)Wittgenstein's second sense of "understanding" is poetic
or intransitive understanding— in which the sense of the
original sentence cannot be commensurate or replaceable with
that of another sentence.

Such replacement is impossible,

because the relation between the sentence and its sense is
exclusive.

(Imagine the damage that could be done to the

Homeric expression "rosy-fingered dawn" in paraphrasis or
explanation, what would happen to Keenan-Ivory Wayans' "I'm
gonna get you sucka,"

or Frank Black's "my heart is crammed

in my cranium— and it still knows how to pound".)
12

PI.526.

No other
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sentence can have that sense— it is "something that is
expressed only by these words in these positions."13
expression creates its own use with its coinage.

Poetic

Its use is

irreplacable in the same way that Wittgenstein says:
I should like to say that "what the picture tells
me is itself." That is, its telling me something
consists in its own structure, in its own lines
and contours14.
Wittgenstein had pointed this out as early as 1932 in
Philosophical Grammar:
It may be that if it is to achieve its effect, a
particular word cannot be replaced by any other;
just as it may be that a particular gesture cannot
be replaced by any other.... No one would believe
a poem remained essentially unaltered if its words
were replaced by others in accordance with an
appropriate convention.15
Intransitive understanding, then, is the ability to inhabit
an uncanny and original expressive practice.

This

inhabitation and this space are what is created when we
understand or "go on" in a completely unique way.

Because

changes in meaning manifest themselves as changes in
behaviour, we inhabit this space by the fact the we act
within it— we appropriate it as a way of behaving, a way of
living.

However, the way in which it is achieved is

dependent on paraphrastic understanding, because the way a
certain expression makes sense is through its relation to
13 PI.531.
14 PI.523, italics mine.
15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. Rush
Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Berkely: U. California Press,
1974) p. 69.
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already sedimented rules and uses.

In the way that meaning

the same thing means "going on" in the same way (as
paraphrastic understanding works), intransitive understanding
comes about by going on in a different way - not a radically
different way, but one that shares a family resemblance to
the ways we have responded to similar expressions.

The

poetic expression is reminiscent of already sedimented
practices (and this is how we can step into them when they
are poeticized versions of familiar practices), but they also
make a new and remarkably different application of the rules
by which those previous practices proceeded.
Colin Falck notes that the "moving forward of the human
spirit" brought about in poetry, art, and other expressive
media relies on the grammar of previous expressions.16

Each

successive grammar reveals the possibilities of its
predecessor. "Metaphor builds on the language-uses we already
have m

an organic, and not a random way."

17

The organic

nature of the relationship between the metaphor (intransitive
expression) and sedimented usage is one of reminiscence or
resemblance; that the grammar is not razed to the ground, but
is subtlely altered.

It is given a twist.

Regular usage of

words develops habits and prejudices about how those words
are to be used.

New usages of these words, then, cater to

16 Colin Falck, " Poetry and Wittgenstein," printed in Ludwig
Wittgenstein: Critical Assesments, Vol. 4, ed. Stuart Shanker
(Dover,NH: Croom Helm, 1986) pp. 371-81.
17 Ibid., p. 372.
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those prejudices (instead of completely throwing all of them
out)— otherwise we cannot understand.
An example of how "one explains the expression,

[or]

transmits one's understanding" may make things a bit
clearer.

18

Take, for example, a genre-picture. If the genre

is not known, it will be unfamiliar to people who look at it-they may not be able to make use of it.

(Imagine ancient

Egyptians looking at an Impressionist painting.)

There are

two ways we could approach bringing these people to an
understanding of the painting: it could either be (a)
explained, or (b) understood intransitively/poetically.
Paraphrasing is not an option, since there is no other
sentence or expression which has the same use.

Moreover,

paraphrasing presupposes a mastery of the realm of practice
that the expression is in— conseguently, the paraphrasis
would be just as unintelligible as the original expression.
(a)

If we decide to explain the painting, what we do is

rework the painting in a manner that is intelligible to our
pedagogical subjects. (We reword the unintelligible poem.)
We might point to lines and colors on the canvas and say,
"That's a chair" or "That's a horse."

We might also draw

another picture in a familiar style that allows
understanding.

We also might say, "it's just like that other

painting you know - the one with the...."
painting alongside familiar paintings.
18

PI.533.

We set the

We say it simply.

We
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put it in "layman's terms," in a language that these
individuals can paraphrase.

But the analogy that supports

the explanation is only a partial one that transforms the
uncanniness of an intransitive expression into something
familiar and conventional.
Kjell Johannssen notes in a similar discussion of the
distinction betwen paraphrastic and intransitive
understanding that in aesthetics, such a procedure offends
our sensibilities - that we would leave something out, that
"understanding paintings is not primarily a matter of
translating them into some other medium of expression."

19

Consequently, the way that our pedagogical subjects will view
such genre paintings in the future will be ignorant of the
analogy's incompleteness, because they will not even come
into contact with that uncanniness; the unique place the
expression holds in the other language-game (painting).
do not know the rules it re-interprets.

They

Moreover, these

individuals will not be able to tell original expressions in
this practice from sedimented expressions.

The uncanniness

and resonance of the original expression— what is the most
compelling and affecting thing about it— is lost.
individuals will look in translation.

These

(This is the danger of

such things as beginner's guides to realms of discourse,e.g.
19 Kjell Johannssen, "Art, Philosophy, and Intransitive
Understanding," in Wittgenstein: Towards a Re-Evaluation,
ed. Rudolph Haller and Johannes Brandi (Vienna: VerlagHolder-Pichler-Tumpsky, 1990) p. 328.
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Cliff's notes, masterplots, etc..

The reader begins to think

of the texts themselves as embellished, confused, and wordy
embodiments of their explanations.)
(b)

If we decide that these individuals should come to

intransitive understanding of the painting, we must "lead"
them to comprehension.

20

This "leading" is something entirely

different from explanation.

Instead of taking the expression

in an unfamiliar and original genre and putting it into a
familiar genre, the leading acclimates these individuals to
the original and unfamiliar genre.

We teach the use of a new

tool by teaching a new technique.

We engender appreciation

for a genre by having the individuals inhabit the genre,
learn its rules and their conventional applications by
applying them themselves.

We set the painting alongside

similar paintings. We then bring our students to a point
where paraphrasis within the practice is understandable, and
by this, we engender the ability to recognize the uncanniness
and resonance of a poetic or original expression within that
practice.

We bring our students into the practice the

expression is part of, and by this, they develop a feeling
for the congruency of the practice.

A nose for congruency is

the precondition for a nose for difference.

They then can

understand the originality and uncanniness of the expression-how it is both congruent with what has been done, but
somehow radically different too.
20

PI.534.

This is not available to
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explanation.

Intransitive understanding, then, is not just

different from explanation in approach, but it is different
in kind.
But the question still remains: how exactly does
acclimation to this practice and recognition of originality
and uncanniness take place?

The clearest answer is training.

Our linguistic practices are rule-bound, but they are not
exhausted in their entirety by the rules. Wittgenstein notes,
"my reasons soon give out.
reasons."

21

two goals:

And then I shall act without

In lxght of this "running out," the training has
(i) to allow those trained to recognize the

appropriate and inappropriate actions within the rule-bounded
expressive space (to develop the ability to understand
paraphrasis), and (ii) to be able, as a consequence of (i),
to recognize the original and uncanny application of a rule.
It is in (ii) that these individuals recognize that "the
application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules,"
and that the poetic expression pushes that rule-boundedness
where there is no rule determining the use of a word.
Intransitivity also

22

draws our attention to the structure of

the language game— but one with a changed perspective.
Intransitive expressions (like paraphrastic expressions)
allow the practice to "speak for itself." What is revealed,
though,is not merely the well-worn paths of somnambulistic
21
22

PI.211.
PI.84.

70
usage (as it does with paraphrasis), but of a new way to go
on and how it is tied to those of well worn paths.

Our

pedagogical subjects recognize the contingency of the
expression, the contingency of the rule's application, and,
by this, the contingency of the very style of being (or
speaking) which produces the expression.
Those who coin and use new expressions and the ones who
understand them make themselves free of conventionalized
practices, because they have created a new way of being.
Because any difference in meaning must manifest itself as a
difference in speech and behaviour, understanding's practical
correlative— being able to go on— in the case of intransitive
expressions is itself intransitive.

Intransitive

understanding jolts us out of our sedimented linguistic
practices, throws us into new perspectives, launches us into
new ways of being and doing.

However, this re-creation's

intelligibility (possibility of practice) hinges wholly on
the recognizability of the re-created rule.

If the old rule

and practice are still recognizable as standing behind the
new practice, the expression's audience and speaker can make
use of it.

The expression invites practice, because its

rules are still perspicuous— the audience can "go on" with
it. The audience can find a foothold. On the other hand, if
the expression does not bring out the old rule in a way that
gives the expression a realm of some form of familiar
practice (if the expression does not lend itself to any kind
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of use), the audience is inclined to believe the speaker
inept or insane (or at best speaking a different language).
The condition that poetic expressions must meet is the
analogy between its own style and the style of the practice
upon which it is parasitic.

The poet must be aware of the

tradition being re-created and whether a re-creation of that
tradition would be intelligible.

Because some rules are more

central to certain languages than others, re-creations of
these rules will be less and less intelligible in accordance
with the rule's centrality.

The more central the rule is to

the language game, the less intelligible its re-working will
be.

This is because intelligibility of an expression is

first and foremost the ability we have to make use of that
expression, and when a rule's application that stands at the
root of the language game is re-created (changed or merely
ignored), the interpreter is given no way to put the
interpretation into practice,

in other words, when an

intransitive expression re-creates a central grammatical rule
(one which is necessary for meaning in the language game),
the expression is merely unintelligible, it is a mistake.

It

precludes its own use. (Imagine a re-creation of the rule by
which we organize words in a declarative sentence— e.g. "My
is tie blue".)

These rules are developed by linguistic

communities as necessary conditions for sense.
Max Black's discussion of rule formation as identification
of aspects of speech acts within linguistic communities ((i)
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required,
here.

23

(ii) forbidden, or (iii) permitted) is helpful

Required speech acts (i) are the necessary conditions

for intelligibly participating in a linguistic practice.
Forbidden speech acts (ii) preclude speakers from even
participating.

Permitted speech acts (iii) can be used, but

they are not necessary for meaningful use.

Rules that

require (i) or forbid (ii) speech acts are what is at issue;
they are the central rules.

When a speaker does not accord

with (i) or (ii), the speaker is no longer meaningfully
engaged in the practice, and the rest of the linguistic
community either sees the individual as confused (and the
community tries to correct or re-train the individual) or the
community sees the individual as utterly helpless, hopeless,
or insane.

Either way, the speech act is not even recognized

to be engaged in the practice in which it was used, because
to respond to the expression would result in razing the
practice to the ground.

The utterance is a tool without an

application.
However, when an expression has to do with a less central
rule— a rule which permits a speech act (iii) and

which does

not forbid certain uses or is not a necessary condition for
sense in the language game— the expression does not make a
preclusion of its own use.

Instead, the expression offers an

alternative (but similar) practice to the one re-created.
23 Max Black, Models and Metaphors, (Ithaca:Cornell U.
Press,1962) pp. 107-8.
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Realms of practice within the language game are still open to
this expression which are not open to the expression that re
creates central rules.

The utterance does not cut itself off

from the language in which it was intended to be meaningful,
because it takes up an aspect of the linguistic practice that
is not subject to correction.

For such speech acts, there is

no logical limit (in terms of normative restrictions) to the
possible activities that could be introduced into a
linguistic practice.
In light of this discussion, two conditions for
intelligibility (usefulness) for intransitive expressions can
be distilled.

They must (a) be such that they are different,

but also reminiscent of similar expressions in an ordered
language game, and (b) they must not be contrary to the rules
central to that language game.

Because intransitive

expressions push between the ordinary forms of justified
actions (ones which appeal to necessary conditions and
customary permissions) and the ordinary forms of unjustified
actions (ones which bear no resemblance to any activities in
the practice or ones which are explicitly made forbidden),
the utterance provides its own justification.

There are no

identical activities that the speaker can gesture toward for
justification.

The intransitive utterance stands by itself.
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III.

How intransitivity becomes a problem

In light of the fact that differences in meaning are
manifested as differences of behaviour (a difference in how
we go on), it is possible that styles of being with
intransitive expressions may become conventionalized and
habitualized, and by this transformation, the expression
loses its earlier power of liberating language users from the
strictures of sedimented practices and habits.
1)

Here is how.

As shown earlier, when we say people understand, we

expect them to be able to go on.

That is, we make a

distinction between people who understand and those who do
not by the way they act.

Those who understand something act

a certain way, and those who do not understand act in another
or in a multiplicity of other ways.

For example, we say only

people who can successfully add understand addition.
2)

Because languages have rules which necessitate and

exclude certain usages, intransitive expressions, when
coined, must be judged to be admissible or inadmissible by a
community of speakers familiar with the language and those
rules.

Speakers of a language are those who decide whether

or not a new way of speaking is to be allowed in the
language.

They are the ones who distinguish intelligible

from unintelligible expressions.
3)

Those who understand an expression have the ability to

make use of it.

Upon understanding an utterance, speakers of

a language have a way of determining when it is appropriate
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to use the expression-

In effect, when the situation in

which the intransitive utterance was coined (or a situation
with a resemblance to the original situation) is repeated,
those who understood the expression in the former can use it
in the latter.
Fiction

Think of all those famous lines from Pulp

being parroted by gen-X'ers.

If the appropriate

situation is common in a language-game (or if there are many
situations that resemble the original situation), the
expression can gain a wider range of usage.

Because

understanding an expression pushes us into new ways of
behaving, the behaviour sets the stage for more situations in
which the expression can be used.

With each new usage, the

language shifts, because the practice of speaking the
language is changed.

And with each repeated usage of the

intransitive expression, the expression moves closer and
closer to the center of the language game.

The expression

becomes conventional.
4)

Regular usage of an expression makes the expression

(and its attendant behaviour) more and more central to the
practice of speaking a language.

The expression becomes more

and more secured, more and more conventional.

(This is where

the difference between fashion and fad, slang and cliche,
originality and banality is formed.)

At this point, the

expression is still reminiscent of its first resonance and
uncanniness, but the coin becomes tarnished with its regular
and systematic usage.

Originality becomes concretized.

In
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addition, when certain marginal forms of expression become
more and more prevalent, they begin to lose the force they
once had.

The context in which they had been originally used

becomes beside the point.

The expressions' contexts become

so wide and so nebulous, the expressions no longer even mean
what they originally meant.

For example, the adage "Neither

a borrower nor a lender be" has been taken to be one of
Shakespeare's kernels of wisdom and has been quoted and
invoked so regularly, we rarely (except for those of us who
read Hamlet carefully) recognize the fact that the expression
was supposed to be ironic.

Polonius uttered it in a fit of

d o t t e r m g about burdening his son with advice.
5)

24

Once an expression becomes more and more central to a

practice, it breeds its own rules.

It breeds normative

behaviour that gestures to the expression when justifying or
eliminating other expressions.

"We [develop] prejudices with

respect to the use of words," and the irony is that the
prejudice comes out of an expression which was originally
used in a way that jarred those who understood it out of
their previous prejudices.

The danger at this point is to

say (as would those bewitched by their prejudices) that this
new way of speaking is more useful than the one prior or
(even if we were to recognize the inclinations to speak one
way or another as a prejudice) that one certain prejudice
represents reality better than another or a previous one.
24

Cf.

Hamlet. I.iii.79.
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Wilfrid Sellars' discussion of the "Jonesian Myth" is
helpful here.25 Sellars' hypothetical Mr. Jones falls into a
similar pit of bewitchment with a new and powerful way of
speaking.

Jones is a man who learns a framework of discourse

about public objects, but he has "taught himself to play with
it as a report language.

Unfortunately,...

[and] with a

modesty forgivable in any but a philosopher, he confuses his
own creative enrichment of the framework of empirical
2g

knowledge, with

an analysis of knowledge as it was".

Because of_ his confusion in his attitude with respect to his
change in the language of possible objects, Jones

speaks

(when in reference to public objects) of a given from which
all knowledge of these objets springs.

"He construes

data the particulars and arrays of particulars which

as
he has

come to be able to observe, and believes them to be
antecedent objects of knowledge which have somehow been in
the framework from the beginning."

27

And because of the

semantic changes in the language due to the new expression
described in (3) (i.e. that changes in certain parts of a
practice affect the practice globally) the meanings
constructed by

the new habits become the given.

These

structures become "the privileged matters of fact" to which
claims for legitimacy appeal (or from which these claims are
25 Wilfrid Sellars,
"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,"
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1956.
26 Ibid., p. 529.
27 Ibid., p. 539.
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derived).

28

Once a certain form of behaviour becomes

concretized to this extent, those who make use of and inhabit
that way of being, lose sight of its contingency.

They

become absorbed in "an episode of the Myth" such that the
role of the community's approval (in 1 and 2) are ignored to
the point that when asked for a genealogy of the practice,
they speak as if the world (independently of language)
provided cue-cards for the language's development, and not
that it was merely a matter of a certain community coming to
certain agreements about how to talk.

As Sellars describes

him, Jones falls into this sensibility, and intransitive
expressions, by their very nature of compelling

us to change

the way we are by showing us a new way of being, have the
power to bewitch us by their creative enrichment of already
available discourses.
Wittgenstein provides a wonderful example of bewitchment
with his description of a response to Schopenhauer's
contention that man's real life span is 100 years.
Wittgenstein's interlocutor gives a wistful cry, "yes, that
is how it is... because that's how it must be!"
it would all make sense that way.
understood a creator's purpose.
29

system."

Of course,

"It's as though you've
You have grasped the

In a sense, we feel tempted to "make divinities of

28 Ibid., p. 508.
29 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G.H. von
Wright, trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: U. Chicago Press, 1980)
p. 26.
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logical constants."

30

But examples for this kind of progression need not be so
obscure.

As language-users (in the widest sense), we see

this kind of progression afoot in every aspect of culture:
the West-Coast offense, body-piercing, "awesome," alt-rock,
"alrighty then," having a coke and a smile, being "cool,"
being "bad," being "rad," being "yourself," the nickel
defense, whatever.

The very utterances which opened new

ways of being close off subsequent ways of being.

Gestures

which added richness to what were grammatically determined
practices become part of that machinery of determination.
What was once novel and liberating is now banal and
constricting.
Our ordinary language, which of all possible
notations is the one which pervades all our life,
holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were,
and in this position sometimes feels cramped....
Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which
stresses a difference or one which in a particular
case uses a more closely similar form of expression
than our ordinary language.
Our mental cramp is
loosened when we are shown the notations which
fulfill these needs 31
The problem at issue here is that once we have met this need,
we make what had relieved our mental cramp part of the
problem.

What was originally a twist or a critique of

"common sense," after a bit of usage, becomes "common sense"
with the same hum-drum-self-contentment that necessitated
such twists and critiques in the first place.
30
31

CV .22.
BB.59, emphasis mine.
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IV.

What is to be done?

In this age of post-Wittgensteinian philosophy, we are
compelled to ask ourselves when presented with a problem:
"how must we look at a problem in order for it to become
solvable?"

32

We should be taking up new descriptive

strategies such that problems are no longer problems; we need
to find ways to dissolve problems.

But this

problem is not

one that can be solved in this way, because the problem is
one with the very strategy with which these problems are
dissolved.

When we provide a new outlook or way of speaking

in order to dissolve one problem, we become prejudiced toward
using that manner of speaking.

We mistake a tincture for a

panacea.
Richard Rorty faces this situation at the end of his
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

33

Once it is clear that

the philosophical enterprise is no longer an inquiry into
essences or representation (i.e. epistemology), what reason
do we even have for redescription (offering new descriptive
strategies, making or using intransitive expressions)?

When

we replace knowledge with self-formation as the goal of
thinking, we see just why these movements of novelty are
necessary.

"The events which make (and allow) us able to say

32 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Remarks on Color, ed. G.E.M.
Anscombe, trans. Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schattle
(Berkeley: U. California Press, 1977) II. section 11.
33 Richard Rorty. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
(Princeton:Princeton U. Press, 1979)
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new and interesting things about ourselves are, in the
nonmetaphysical sense, more 'essential' to us than the events
[and conventionalized practices] whic ... shape our standard
of living."

34

Those new and interesting gestures and

utterances are what edify us in the face of the homogeneity
of convention— "edifying discourse is supposed to be
abnormal, to take us out of our old

selves by the power of

strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings."

35

in the face

of the problem of conventionalization in the practice of
philosophy, Rorty distinguishes systematic philosophers
edifying philosophers.

and

The latter are first and foremost

skeptical of systematic philosophy, but not because they
stand as revolutionaries to contented actors and speakers.
Both

kinds of philosopher offer new descriptive strategies,

because both are discontented with and stifled by the
conventional theoretical discourse.

But the difference lies

in what these philosophers plan to do with their new ways of
speaking.36

Systematic philosophers are constructive and

offer arguments such that their manner of speaking may be
institutionalized.
philosophy."

Their battle cry is "the end of

They "build for eternity."

subject on the path of a science.

They put their

The systematic philosopher

recognizes what will happen to this new way of speaking and
is more than willing to embrace it.
34
35
36

Ibid., p. 359.
Ibid., p. 360.
Ibid., p. 369.
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The edifying philosophers, on the other hand, "dread the
thought that their vocabularies should ever be
institutionalized, or that their writing might be seen as
commensurable with the tradition."37
reactive to the systematists.
parodies.

To avoid this, they are

They write satires and

They offer only aphorisms.

They speak and write

in ways that are intentionally peripheral.

They adopt a

style that they suppose cannot become an institution.
Consequently, edifying philosophy is always parasitic, always
needing something to critique, always needing a straight-man
to converse with, confound, and ultimately exasperate.

The

role that the edifying philosopher plays, then, is that of
helping us to avoid the bewitchment and self-deception which
comes from believing our current way of speaking
final.

to be

The edifying philosopher sees human beings as

"generators of new descriptions rather than beings one hopes
to be able to describe accurately."

38

And, by this attitude,

the edifying philosopher furnishes the rest of the community
with a wealth of reasons to find a new way of speaking and
may even offer up her own as an option.
One way to see edifying philosophy ... is to see it
as the attempt to prevent conversation from
degenerating into inquiry, into a research program.
Edifying philosophers can never end philosophy.39
The reason why edifying philosophers know they must "keep the
37
38
39

Ibid., p. 377.
Ibid., p. 378.
Ibid., p. 372, emphasis mine.
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conversation going" is because not only do they feel the
"mental cramp" Wittgenstein had gestured toward, but also
because they see the danger of setting up a final and
privileged vocabulary.

They are trying to prevent a freeze-

over of their discipline and their culture.

What is so

frightening about the possibility is the automatic nature of
thought once certain descriptions are no longer being
questioned.

In the same way we are suspicious that people

who justify their decisions with cliches (e.g. Polonius and
those who make use of his expressions) are not really
thinking, the edifying philosopher has the sneaking suspicion
that once a discipline's final vocabulary and theoretical
issues are put to rest, that discipline will become one big
cliche with unthinking practitioners.

We will cease to be

human, because we will begin to see ourselves as something
decided.40
The edifying philosopher, acting as the philosophical
anarchist, works to dismantle the systematics in a manner
that cannot be systematized.

That is, they decry the very

notion of having a definite view while denying they
themselves have definite views.

This, of course, is a self-

referential paradox, but the edifying philosopher does not
seem to even be phased by this charge.
But regardless of this technical absurdity, does Rorty's
romanticized edifying philosopher do enough?
40

Ibid., p. 377.

According to
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Rorty, Heidegger was an edifying philosopher par excellence,
but his language became institutionalized jargon almost
immediately.

Heidegger himself was appalled that his

expression "language is the house of Being" had become a
"mere catchword"41

It does no good to be appalled, and it

does no good to try to keep it from happening.

As it

appears, no matter what the intent with which these new ways
of speaking are posed they ensnare us.

Even if they demand

that they be surpassed, they become entrapments.

Style alone

cannot keep ways of speaking and writing from becoming
institutions. They inevitably become encrusted with
convention.

In light of this problem with Rorty's attempt to

dissolve the issue with a new descriptive strategy, it does
not matter what is said, who is saying it, or how it was
meant to be taken, because if the expression or way of being
resonates (is useful), it will be turned into an institution.
(Just look at any journal of literary criticism, where it
seems, ironically, everybody writes just like Derrida, but
not in jest.

Even better, just look at how counter-culture

has a dress code.)
Wittgenstein's discussion of Breuer, Freud's co-author in
Studies in Hysteria, points in a fruitful direction.
Wittgenstein says that "the real germ of psycho-analysis came
from Breuer, not Freud.

Of course, Breuer's seed-grain can

41 Cf. Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language,
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1971) p.27.

(San
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only have been quite tiny.

Courage is always original."

Where did this courage lie for Breuer?

42

Breuer's humility in

the face of facts and their explanations is obvious in his
collaborations with Freud (especially against the backdrop of
Freud's brashness).

He was not inclined to trace the

etiology of hysteria and neuroses directly back to erotic
breakdown every time, and Wittgenstein had noted that Breuer
had first proposed, but then dismissed the generalization of
the seductive paradigm.

Jaques Bouveresse notes in

Wittgenstein Reads Freud how Wittgenstein had seen the
temptation to finalize and divinize the language and method
of psychoanalysis, and had pointed out that giving in to that
temptation is an indication of a profound desire to distill
ourselves, to make divinities of certain concepts.
For Wittgenstein, a person who thinks there must be
one correct explanation and one correct reason
for the sort of phenomena treated in psychoanalysis
is not someone merely adopting a dominant
scientific attitude, but someone who is already on
the road to producing a mythology.43
Breuer, nevertheless, continued to make use of the
descriptive (and investigative) strategy, not because he
wanted it to (or believed it to) work in all cases all the
time, but because he saw the limits of it, and was aware of
when his usage of the strategy stretched it to the point
where it became a dogmatism and not a description.

Breuer's

42 CV .36.
43 Jaques Bouveresse,
Wittgenstein Reads Freud, trans. Carol
Cosman (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1995) p. 13.
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courage lay in his willingness to recognize even his own
groundbreaking descriptive strategy as what it was, a tool
with a specific use.
Because we recognize it is not that things must be a
certain way, we become more self-conscious about how we
philosophize.

We recognize how we become self-forgetful when

we are captured by

certain pictures of thinking, ourselves,

and how things hang together.

44

But when we recognize the

potential for the same kind of literalization to take place
with the things we say (regardless of how much they demand to
be taken up and overcome as Heidegger's had), we see how we
are responsible for what we say.

The question, though, is

how we can proceed responsibly, how to continue the
conversation without the possibility of literalization.
answer is that we cannot.

The

The potential for our expressions

to become dogma always hangs in the background of our
conversations.

The only way to face this possibility is to

encourage informed criticism and continued inquiry.

We

develop misgivings about accounts framed with the expression
"how it is possible that ...."

We begin to provide

intellectual therapy for our temptations to canonize our ways
of speaking.

We fall out of love with generality.

However, our discussions do not take the form of a
negative theology or a tense silence, as though we only want
44 Cf. James Edwards, Ethics Without Philosophy, (Tampa,FL:
U. South Florida Press, 1985) pp 152-3.
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to make retractions of everything we say.

That is, we do not

necessarily have to criticize continually, satirize, and
overturn every one of our attempts at saying something in
favor of saying nothing.

Resistance to institutionalization

cannot be found solely in style. Instead, we make it our
business to explore the possibilities of how we can describe
things, gesture toward one another, and organize our lives.
But we must be continually aware of the limits of these
strategies, of their dangers, and of their temptations.

And

we can only maintain such a carefulness in a community of
fellow inquirers.

That is, it is not a question of what kind

of style of inquiry will avoid being literalized (as those
who mistakenly think the aphorism and metaphor do).

Rather,

it is a question about what attitude we will have about our
styles of inquiry, what character we must have in order to
resist homogeneity.

So in turn, it is not that we have to

relaese ourselves from all of our conventions and traditions
or criticize every picture we use.

Many are still useful and

important to us.
It is true that we can compare a picture that is
firmly rooted in us to a superstition; but it is
equally
true that we always eventually have to
reach some firm ground, either a picture or
something else, so that picture which is at the
root of all our thinking is tobe respected and not
treated as a superstition.45
As a consequence, we should have no qualms about developing
a theory or offering a new description.
45

CV.83

We are allowed to
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have a view (instead of insisting, as the edifying
philosopher does, that we have no view), but we must make
sure to use it as a view from a perspective instead of being
sub specie aeterni.
What Wittgenstein meant by “courage is always original" in
the discussion of Breuer is clear.

This virtue is a state of

character that pushes us to maintain an honesty about our
modes of description, to engage others, to criticize, to make
informed use of conventions, and to be forthright about our
conventions' contingencies.

What we require to be able to

resist literalization's temptations to take intransitive
expressions as more than their suggestive language is a
courage to steel us and prompt us to find new ways of
speaking.

Instead of being philosopical revolutionaries (as

the systematic philosophers) or philosophical anarchists (as
the edifying philosophers), we must find the courage to walk
between the two and to speak critically in a community of
critical listeners, to be philosopical conversationalists.

Plato's M e n o and a Problem

89

for Moral

Education

90

I
The Meno opens with Meno asking "is virtue something
that can be taught? Or does it come by practice? Or is it
neither teaching nor practice that gives it to a man but
natural aptitude or something else?"1

But the dialogue ends

with Socrates concluding that "virtue will be acquired
neither by nature nor by teaching.
divine dispensation" (99e).

Whoever has it gets it by

Apparently, virtue comes to us

by "something else." If Plato is seriously contending virtue
comes only by way of divine dispensation, his project as a
philosopher— showing how by applying our reason, we can live
virtuously and justly— should be at an end.
the impossibility of his own enterprise.

He has proved

No matter how hard

we try to apply our reason, we cannot have an effect beyond
what the gods have already determined.
not Plato's last dialogue?

So why is the Meno

That is, the Meno has

traditionally been considered a late early dialogue—

one

that resembles the early dialogues in much of its style
(direct conversation) and substance (confrontation of
sophistry), but also different from them in that it continues
after the interlocutor has been reduced to perplexity.

Most

scholars situate the dialogue's composition date around those
of the Protagoras and the Gorgias, but before the Symposium
and the Phaedo.

So the problem is, then, if Plato intends

1 Plato, Meno, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, 70a. All subsequent
references to the Meno will be from this translation.

91
the dialogue's conclusion literally, why did he continue to
write philosophy and teach ethics in the Academy?
The challenge Plato poses in the Meno is for his readers
to make sense of how the dialogue works.

The pressing

problem is how we reconcile it with the rest of the Platonic
corpus.

In earlier (and later) dialogues, Socrates Oontends

that virtue is knowledge.

2

.

In turn, if virtue is knowledge,

we can reasonably expect it to be teachable.3

The dialogue's

explicit conclusion, then, contradicts the Platonic doctrine
that virtue is knowledge— if virtue cannot be taught, it must
not be knowledge.4
The dialogue's aporetic conclusion not only gives
scholars who argue for the unity of Plato's thought
headaches, but it also is the source of moral anxiety,
because praise and blame for our actions is groundless if
this is the case.

If virtue comes from divine dispensation,

we are not responsible for our moral failings or our moral
successes.

If my moral character is determined by factors

beyond my control, how can I be held responsible for my
conduct?

Those who are vicious should only be pitied and

avoided, since we can only speak of their bad luck.
2 E.g. Protagoras 360d, Laches 198, Gorgias 460b-d.
3 Socrates, in fact, makes this same move at Meno 89c.
4 Much of this argument relies on the fact that there is not
a species of knowledge the is not teachable, which, in fact,
can be construed to be at the core of the problem. What
seems to be the case in the conversion implicit in moral
education is that the student must contribute to the
education in a manner that cannot be taught, but must evoked
and relied upon.
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Moreover, we have no chance of rehabilitating them.

The

virtuous, on the other hand, deserve no praise or admiration,
since people only deserve praise for things they have earned
themselves, not for things that have been given them.5

In a

sense, we are rendered morally impotent.
In the face of its conclusion that virtue cannot be
taught, the Meno's drama enigmatically revolves around
education.

Socrates teaches Meno how to pursue philosophical

investigations.

He also teaches Meno's slave some geometry.

Alexander Sesonske points out that these lessons (most
notably the demonstration with the slave boy) share the same
form in that the student progresses through states of
knowledge according to a certain pattern:
1) the state of unacknowledged ignorance, when one
confidently says incorrectly without knowing,
2) the state of acknowledged ignorance, when one
sees that he does not know and therefore
cannot say,
3) the state of true opinion which develops from
inquiry, when one confidently says correctly
without knowing,
4) the state of knowledge, when one knows and
knowingly says,
and 5) the underlying state of latent knowledge, a kind
of knowing without saying which makes the
transition from (1) to (4) possible.6
This progression of states of knowledge amounts to an
educational model, since it represents a coming to know in
5 Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, III.1.1109b.30-35.
6 Alexander Sesonske, "Knowing and Saying: the Structure of
Plato's Meno," in Plato's Meno: Text and Criticism, ed.
Alexander Sesonske and Noel Fleming (Belmont: Wadsworth
Publishing Co., 1965) p. 34.
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the form of a deepening relationship a person has with a
subject.

Students must come to recognize they do not know a
J.

subject to take it upon themselves to pursue further inquiry
into a matter.

The problem, though, is how students go from

(2), the state of acknowledged ignorance, to (3), saying
confidently and correctly without knowing.

Meno, when he is

reduced to perplexity— i.e., when he is shown that he cannot
answer adequately or correctly about something he claims to
know— states his famous paradox:
But how do you look for something when you don't in
the least know what it is? How on earth are you
going to set up something you don't know as the
object of your search? To put it another way, even
if you come right up against it, how will you know
that what you have is the right thing you don't
know? (80d)
Meno's paradox is divisible into two questions: (i) how do we
recognize when we are right when we cannot say what our
criterion for being right is, and (ii) how do we say anything
at all while knowing we do not know?7

What is implied here,

then, is that the resolution to the paradox (and the two
problems it implies) can show how it is possible to go from
the state of acknowledged ignorance to the state of speaking
confidently without knowing.
Socrates provides two answers to question (i):

the myth

of recollection and his short demonstration with Meno's slave
boy.
7

The myth of recollection is that souls are immortal and

Ibid., p. 91.
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have learned everything that is.

As a consequence, when we

are learning, we are really remembering.
a reminding.

Teaching, then, is

However, if taken literally, the myth does not

provide an account of how we take ourselves from ignorance to
knowledge, because all it provides is an account of how we
would be able to do it now that our souls have already
learned everything.

It merely puts off the question of

recognizing when we are right without having a criterion by
saying it happened a long time ago.
Regardless of this problem, what the myth does reveal is
a suppressed premise in the Meno, viz., that we are always in
g
possession of a modicum of knowledge.
We are never totally
ignorant.

However, much of that knowledge is tacit and

unarticulated.

What the project is for those who wish to

know, then, is to bring their tacit knowledge to light and
lend it an articulate voice.

The question, then, is how do

we do that?
In his conversation with the slave boy, Socrates shows
Meno how it is possible to recognize speaking correctly even
without an explicit criterion for being right.

He asks the

slave boy how he would double the area of a 2x2 square he has
drawn in the sand.

The boy confidently responds that he

should double the length of the sides.

Socrates shows the

boy his error: if he doubles the length of the sides, the
square's area quadruples instead of doubles.
8

Cf. Sesonske, Op. cit., p. 86.

The slave boy
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is reduced to perplexity— he is unable to answer correctly at
all.

He recognizes he does not know.

Socrates leads the

slave boy through a construction which allows him to give a
correct answer to the geometrical problem.

Throughout the

demonstration, Socrates shows that the boy "was unable to say
what the answer was or even how to go about finding it...,
yet he could recognize as true the very things he could not
9

say."

Socrates is quick to point out that the slave boy still
does not know.

He says, "...these opinions, being newly

aroused, have a dreamlike quality," but if the boy were to
practice the technique Socrates used many times, they would
become knowledge (85c).

The slave boy, then, can be taught

geometry.
The myth of recollection and Socrates' conversation with
the slave boy answer the first question in Meno's paradox
(How do we recognize speaking correctly when we do not have a
criterion for it?), but the second question in the paradox
still remains:
do not know?

how do we say anything at all when we know we
Socrates' discussion with Meno serves to

illuminate how we would go from the state of acknowledged
ignorance, where we see that we do not know, and therefore
cannot say, to the state of true opinion, where we recognize
saying correctly as saying correctly without knowing.
Because Socrates already knew the answer to the geometrical
9

Sesonske, Op. cit., p. 92, emphasis mine.
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problem he poses for the slave boy, he could only demonstrate
that it is possible to recognize saying correctly as saying
correctly without knowing.

However, Socrates' method of

pursuing a definition of virtue, because neither he nor Meno
know and they recognize their ignorance,10 provides an answer
to the second question in the paradox.

There must be an

intermediary state between (2) the state of acknowledged
ignorance and (3) the state of true opinion developed from
inquiry:
2B) Saying tentatively without knowing; saying
something which we know we do not know in
order to see what happens after we say it,
i.e. saying hypothetically.11
Socrates suggests that they "make use of a hypothesis— the
sort of thing geometers use in their inquiries"(86e).

That

is, when we know we do not know the answer to a question, we
do not simply throw our hands up in the air or shrug our
shoulders and give up.

Instead, we respond by saying, "I

don't know yet whether it fulfills the conditions, but I
think I have a hypothesis which will help us in the
matter"(87a).

We speak tentatively, and when we speak

correctly, we will be able to recognize it as speaking
correctly.
10 This assumption that Socrates does not know what virtue is
comes from 71a, where he says he has no idea what virtue is.
It is a necessary part of cooperative inquiry, because the
way recognizing our own ignorance works is that it prompts us
to pursue knowledge.
If we find that we already know, we
would not have an impetus to pursue an inquiry.
11 Sesonske, Op. cit., p. 92, emphasis mine.
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11

There is a marked difference between the first two
states in the educational model at work in the dialogue.

The

first state, speaking confidently out of ignorance, smacks of
presumption and arrogance.

But once one recognizes one's

ignorance in the second state, that presumption fades into
carefulness and attentiveness.

Arrogance turns to humility.

When Socrates reduces the slave boy to perplexity, he remarks
to Meno:
Soc: So in perplexing him and numbing him like the
stingray, have we done him any harm?
Men: I think not.
Soc: In fact, we have helped him to some extent
toward finding out the right answer, for up to
now not only is he ignorant of it, he will be
quite glad to look for it. Up to now, he
thought he could speak well and fluently, on
many occasions and before large audiences, on
the subject....(82d)
Socrates points out two factors here that the reduction to
perplexity overcomes:

(i) the student's ignorance of her own

ignorance, and (ii) the student's willingness to act on and
propagate opinions that are in fact wrong.

In being reduced

to perplexity, the slave boy not only wishes to pursue the
truth, but also stops confidently speaking falsities.

Now,

the moral implications of the difference between not knowing
one does not know how to double the area of a square and
knowing one does not know are not profound, but those of
analogous situations (e.g., knowing one does not know what
virtue, piety, or courage is) are.

The Euthyphro

is
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illustrative of this difference.

Euthyphro brings charges of

impiety against his own father, but he cannot even explain
what piety is, and he seems not even to be cognizant of his
own ignorance.

12

The consequences include his father's

possible death, and he is acting irresponsibly.

We suspect

that if Euthyphro were to recognize his ignorance, he would
no longer pursue his suit against his father.13
Meno also undergoes a similar change when he is reduced
to perplexity.

He cannot give an adequate definition of

virtue, so he slowly starts to come to a recognition of his
ignorance of virtue.

That is, he is started on a progression

from unacknowledged ignorance to acknowledged ignorance by
the fact that he cannot give a definition of virtue.
confidence in his supposed knowledge is waning.

His

The

progression should take the form:
(i) being thrown into perplexity (not being able
to answer adequately),
(ii) becoming aware of ignorance,
and (iii) desiring to know.14
Each of these stages accords with and supplements states in
the model for education in that (i) the reduction to
perplexity is the transition stage between (1) the state of
speaking confidently out of ignorance to (2) the state of
recognizing one's own ignorance.

For his part, Meno cannot

12 Cf. Euthyphro 15d-e.
13 Of course, Euthyphro has other reasons for pursuing this
suit beyond his supposed regard for piety. He also wants his
inheritance, which has been a long time in the coming.
14 Socrates suggests this progression at 84c in his
description of his discussion with the slave boy.
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answer.

He has been thrown into perplexity, and he is coming

to suspect that he does not know what virtue is.
Yet I have spoken about virtue hundreds of times,
held forth often on the subject in front of large
audiences, and very well too, or so I thought. Now
I can't even say what it is. (80b)
The similarity between what Meno says of himself here and
what Socrates says of the slave boy at 84b is much too marked
to be coincidence.

Socrates, by using Meno's own expression,

shows his disapproval of Meno's flippancy about the matter by
showing how ridiculous Meno appears to those who either know
(as with geometry) and those who know they do not know (as
with virtue).
his perplexity.

But Meno lacks patience enough to reflect upon
He does not respond to his inability to

define virtue by admitting his ignorance and expressing a
desire to know what virtue is; instead, he merely admits to
the

importance of the problem then proceeds to ask after

virtue's teachability.

But this need not mean that Meno's

soul is marred or that he is unfit for inquiry, as some
commentators have suggested.15

Instead, it may merely mean

that it takes longer for the recognition of our own ignorance
in certain matters to come than in others.

The slave boy

owns up to his ignorance of geometry much more willingly than
Meno of virtue for a few reasons:
1) The boy has had no training in geometry and has never
15 Cf. Jacob Klein, A Commentary on Plato's Meno (Chicago: U.
Chicago Press, 1965) p. 186, and Herold Stern, "Philosophy
and Education in Plato's Meno," Educational Studies, Vol.12,
Spring 1981, No. 1, pp. 22-34.
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spoken on the matter before, while Meno claims to have
had extensive training in discussing virtue and has
spoken about it many times in the past.
2) It is

much more obvious when people do not know what

they are

doing in geometry than in discussions of

virtue, because there are very concrete ways of
determining how things are working out in geometry.
That is,

Socrates can show the slave boy he is wrong by

pointing

out thathis suggestion quadruples the area of

the square instead of doubles it.

The criteria for the

adequacy of Meno's account are much more slippery.
3) Meno's conception of, and training in, intellectual
discussion is more competitive than cooperative.

He

responds incredulously when Socrates admits his own
ignorance(70c).

The boy, on the other hand, has had no

exposureany style of inquiry, so he has no predilection
for either competitive or cooperative inquiry.
Meno may be resistant to owning up to not knowing what
virtue is, but that resistance is not an impossible barrier.
All it would require for Meno to come to admitting his
ignorance is a change of how he saw his discussion with
Socrates— were he to see the discussion as a friendly
conversation instead of as a competition, he would be more
inclined to acknowledge his ignorance.

Unfortunately,

Socrates seems to be unable to change Meno's mind about the
matter.

101

III
Thus far I have focused on the moral value of restraint
in recognizing our ignorance in a matter.

That is, when we

see we do not know, we are less likely to blunder about as if
we did know.

We would not, as Euthyphro does, push to punish

people for impiety if we see we do not know what piety is.
Moreover, we would see what would be implicitly wrong with
such activities— we would see them as hubristic.

We would

see them as acts of presumption and irresponsibility.

I now

turn to a description of the moral value of the pursuit of
knowledge which comes out of recognizing our ignorance in a
matter.

As noted earlier, when reduced to perplexity, we

should be inclined to recognize our own ignorance and be
filled with a desire to come to the truth of the matter.

How

we go about pursuing that truth, though, must be restrained
and tentative inquiry, since we do not know--speaking
confidently when we are ignorant is what created to problem
to begin with.
After showing that forays into matters unknown can be
successful {with his discussion with the slave boy), Socrates
attests to the value of not just remaining silent after being
reduced to perplexity, but making a go of it:
I shouldn't like to take my oath on the whole
story, but one thing I am ready to fight for in
word and act - that is, that we shall be better,
braver, and more active men if we believe it is
right to look for what we don't know than if we
believe there is no point in looking because what
we don't know we can never discover.(86b-c)
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We are improved by pursuing the truth.

We become better and

braver because we take responsibility for what we do and say.
We take a role in shaping our own lives by investigating and
questioning the concepts that inform our activities.
strive to make informed decisions.

We

We own up to actions in

our past that have been determined by ignorance and
misconception.

We become more active, because acting and

speaking responsibly requires us to be continually attentive.
We train ourselves to be honest, intrepid, and thorough in
our investigations and our evaluations of others'
investigations.
Socrates, in showing Meno some rudimentary rules for
defining virtue (e.g., that examples are not definitions, but
definitions must meet the test of examples), is teaching him
how to contribute to a cooperative inquiry.

He is giving

Meno the conceptual tools for doing something productive and
responsible with his inquiry.

He is training Meno to respond

to the necessities of a practice.

He is showing Meno what

excellence is.
We can see, now, how the practice of living the examined
life engenders virtue.

On one hand, we no longer act

irresponsibly by acting out of ignorance.

We recognize the

problem with acting and speaking confidently when we do not
know: innocent people (e.g., Euthyphro's father) can suffer
as a consequence.

On the other hand, we take it upon

ourselves to come to the truth pf the matter so that we may
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not only speak and act confidently but also with knowledge.
We try to make informed and responsible decisions.

Once we

recognize our ignorance, we try to be attentive to how we
tentatively work things out with those who are our fellow
inquirers.

IV

The difference between being reduced to perplexity
(being unable to answer correctly or adequately) and
recognizing one's own ignorance is the fact that with the
latter, upon being reduced to perplexity, one must
acknowledge one's ignorance.

That is, teachers can point to

the fact that students' attempts do not fulfill the
conditions necessary for adequate accounts, as Socrates does
with Meno's definitions of virtue, or are simply incorrect,
as Socrates does with the slave boy's attempts to double the
size of the 2x2 square, but students must make the gesture of
acknowledging their own ignorance on their own (no one else
can do that for them).

A student's ignorance can be revealed

by the teacher, but the student must choose by herself to
acknowledge that ignorance.

The same with the desire to

pursue an inquiry into the truth of the matter.
must be internal.

The impetus

The student must see the value in pursuing

inquiry, and that impetus cannot be coerced— it can only be
evoked.

The problem, then, is how teachers can lead students
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to come to choose to pursue inquiry by themselves.

How can

an appreciation for the value of inquiry be evoked?
The impetus to continue inquiry is not generated by
being reduced to perplexity.

Meno, when he states his

paradox— how do we find what we are looking for when we don't
know what we are looking for?— is balking at the very idea of
continuing inquiry.

The slave boy, when shown he does not

know, says, "it's no use, Socrates, I just don't know"(84a).
He has to be shown how to go on.

Now, Socrates provides a

good example for him, and he may emulate Socrates in his
further attempts at solving similar problems, but what
motivates him to do this?
An example might make things clearer here.

Alasdair

MacIntyre, in his discussion of virtue and training mentions
a highly intelligent seven-year-old whom he wishes to teach
to play chess.

The child has no particular interest in

chess, but she really likes candy and has few chances at
getting it.
I therefore tell the child that if the child will
play chess with me once a week, I will give the
child 50 cents worth of candy; moreover, I tell the
child that I will always play in such a way that it
will be difficult, but not impossible, for the
child to win and that, if the child wins, the child
will receive an extra 50 cents worth of candy.
Thus motivated, the child plays and plays to win.16
At first, the candy alone is the child's reason for playing
the game.

The teacher hopes that at some point along the

16 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame U. Press,
1981) p. 188.
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way, the child will begin to find some goods specific to
chess— that is, ones that do not necessarily lead to sweets.
At a certain point, the child will develop a taste (so to
speak) for the game— for its gambits, its subtleties, and its
nuances.

As a consequence, there can be two kinds of goods

that would motivate the child to play chess:
On one hand there are those goods externally and
contingently attached to chess-playing and other
practices by the accidents of social circumstance in the case of the imaginary child candy, in the
case of real adults such goods as prestige, status
and money.... On the other hand there are goods
internal to the practice of chess which cannot be
had in any way but by playing chess for some other
game of that specific kind.17
in the case of the first kind of motivation, students are
only taught the value of a practice by what it produces— what
other goods can be achieved by it.

18

There are many ways for

MacIntyre's child to get candy, and were one that provided
more candy on a more regular basis to come along, the child
motivated solely by the first kind of goods (external goods)
would stop playing chess altogether.

On the other hand, the

child who has developed a real taste for the game (one who
has come to appreciate its internal goods) might pursue the
other way of getting candy also (out of her love for it), but
would continue to play chess no matter how much candy she
W
J 19
had.

17 Ibid., p. 188.
18 That is, chess for the child is analogous to the examined
life and the inquiry necessary for it for Plato's students.
19 Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1140b.15-20.
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Socrates, in his discussion with Anytus, suggests that
the sons of Athens' great men, the sons of Pericles,
Themistocles, and Thucydides, etc., fall into this chasm
between appreciating a practice's external goods and
appreciating its internal goods.

They pursue only the goods

external and accidental to a life of excellence.
praise and prestige.

They pursue

Themistocles' son, despite being

exposed to an example of virtue, grew up to be nothing more
than a skilled horseman (93d).
esteemed wrestlers (94c).

Thucydides' sons came to be

But none of them esteemed

themselves by being virtuous men, despite being given the
best education in Athens and having virtuous fathers as role
models.

These men came to see virtue as one means for

attaining praise among many.

They, no matter their exposure

to their fathers' examples of virtue, never came to see its
internal goods.

Just as the child who would give up on chess

when a more effective candy-procuring means is made
available, these men lost interest in pursuing excellence
when more readily masterable exercises came to be available.
What the problem comes to, then, is that we can provide the
necessary conditions

for seeing the value of inquiry, but we

cannot provide the sufficient conditions for students to see
that value.

That is, students must recognize their own

ignorance in a matter for them to see the value of pursuing
the truth of the matter, but having their ignorance pointed
out to them is not sufficient to produce the desire to
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inquire.

Students may be shown the value of inquiry, but

they must take it upon themselves to see it.

V

In the opening moments of the dialogue, Socrates
compares how, in Thessaly, Gorgias teaches his students to
answer questions and how Athenians answer questions.
Gorgias, when he arrived in Larissa, captured the hearts of
the noblemen there.

He then taught Meno and the other

members of the nobility the art of oratory:
In particular, he grot you in the habit of answering
any question you might be asked, with the
confidence and dignity appropriate to those who
know the answers, just as he himself invites
questions of every kind from everyone in the Greek
world who wishes to ask, and never fails to answer
them (70c, emphasis mine).
Gorgias teaches his students to speak confidently and with
authority, but he does not teach them to question each other.
He does not give his students the tools to tell good
arguments from bad ones; he only teaches them to distinguish
when speakers are confident or not.

The way disagreements

are to be worked out, then, is by way of a struggle of wills,
a shouting match, a rhetorical duel.

There is no method or

standard by which competing claims can be adjudicated and
reconciled.
On the other hand, Socrates says that in Athens, "it is
the reverse."

The citizens of Athens make no pretenses to

knowing things they do not know.

Socrates ironically remarks
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that it is as if all the wisdom had migrated from Athens to
Larissa, since:
if you put your question to any of our people, they
would all alike laugh and say, You must think I am
singularly fortunate, to know whether virtue can be
taught or how it is acquired. The fact is that far
from knowing whether it can be taught, I have no
idea what virtue is (71a).
Socrates then counts himself one of the Athenians who would
admit to not knowing what virtue is.

The point of this

contrast between Athenian and Thessalian dialogical character
is to demonstrate two ways we may cope with the suspicion
that we may not know.

Either we can feign confidence in what

we say in order to convince those around us to take what we
say to be right, or we can admit that we do not know, speak
tentatively, and aspire to find the truth of the matter.

As

noted earlier, from the point of view of the latter, the
former method is a training in presumption and
irresponsibility.

It is tantamount to a training in

complacency in ignorance.

However, from the perspective of

the competitive speaker (the Larissan and sophist), Socrates'
admission of ignorance is just as incomprehensible.
taken aback at Socrates' admission.

Meno is

He asks, "is this the

report we are to take home about you?"(71c)

In Meno's eyes,

Socrates has lost the competition before it even gets
started, because the whole point of

the competitive model of

inquiry is to get others to admit they do not know.

As a

consequence, when Socrates reduces him to perplexity later in
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the dialogue, Meno responds with his puzzle instead of
admitting to his ignorance.

He does not want to lose, but he

cannot see that Socrates is not trying to beat him.
Meno's first definition of virtue for a man is that it
"consists of managing the city's affairs capably...so that he
will help his friends and injure his foes while taking care
to come to no harm himself"(71e).

His final attempt to

define virtue is that it is "to rejoice in the fine and have
power"(77b).

Both of these definitions are clues to Meno's

predilection for types of inquiry and his motivations for
praising and pursuing virtue— namely, that he pursues virtue
and inquiry for their external goods.

He is interested in

virtue because of what comes with it— success, fine things,
pleasure, power, etc..

He pursues inquiry for similar

reasons— to win arguments and not only to have the power of
convincing people they do not know, but to have the power of
convincing people that he does know.

As a consequence, he is

inclined to think of inquiry as coercion and confrontation.
Later, after he has given an example of an adequate
definition of shape, Socrates makes a distinction between
kinds of questioners:

"the clever, disputatious, and

quarrelsome kind," and "friendly people, like you and me,
[who] want to converse with each other"(75c-d).
kind are out to refute one another.

The first

They work alone.

The

other kind proceed in a manner more conducive to discussion.
They try to maintain the milder and gentler conversational
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manner of inquiry.

They try to cooperate in their

investigation.
Anytus' mistrust of Socrates comes out when Socrates
confounds him by producing counter-examples to his contention
that virtue can be taught in Athens.

He himself is one of

the contentious types of fellow inquirers, and he suspects
Socrates of being one.

He warns Socrates:

You seem to me, Socrates, to be too ready to run
people down. My advice to you, if you will listen
to it, is to be careful.
I dare say that in all
cities it is easier to do a man harm than good, and
it is certainly so here, as I expect you know
yourself.(94e)
He thinks Socrates is only out to humiliate by proving people
do not know.

He does not see any value in Socrates' showing

him that he is wrong in thinking that virtue can be taught in
Athens, since he is more interested in maintaining his
appearance of confidence and dignity as one who knows than in
actually being one who knows.

For Anytus, too, inquiry into

the truth of matters of which he does not know and the
excellence it engenders is only a means to ends well beyond
it— namely, having power and seeking pleasure.

VI

The Meno's theory of moral education, though it shows
how it is possible to teach virtue, also points to the
indissoluble resistances to seeing the goods internal to
inquiry.

Plato presents a situation in which all the
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necessary conditions can be met for moral education to be
successful-— a reduction to perplexity, a good role model,
time for meticulous investigation, a subject with definite
requirements— but all these conditions do not amount to a
sufficient condition

for virtue to be taught.

That is,

Socrates can show Meno and Anytus the value implicit in
admitting they do not know, but, yet proceeding with their
inquiries, but he cannot make them see the value in it.
Students of virtue must come to see the goods internal to
inquiry on their own.

They can be given the tools, but only

they can decide to use them.

Even when conditions are

optimal, as with the sons of Athens' great men, students may
never come to a recognition of the goods internal to the
examined life.
Much of this resistance comes from a certain idea of
freedom, viz., that freedom implies that we always know what
we really want and what is good for us, and any correction or
scepticism from anybody else is an imposition.

Socrates

gestures toward this idea of freedom when he chastises Meno
for resisting the necessities of the subject at hand (86c).
Meno values his freedom, and as a consequence, he makes no
attempt to govern his actions to accord with the demands that
his inquiry with Socrates entails.

He refuses to be told

what to do even when it has been made clear that (and how) it
is for his own good.

He acknowledges the importance of

pursuing a definition of virtue before inquiring into its
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attributes, but is ambivalent to it:

"All the same, I would

rather consider the question as I put it at the
beginning"(86c).

He seems complacent in his ignorance— as if

he is sure his confidence will win the day when he is around
anyone other than Socrates.
This brings us to a re-evaluation of the dialogue's
conclusion.

What has been shown here is not, as thought

before, that no matter how hard we try to apply our reason,
we cannot overcome the determinations the gods have made.
Instead, it is clear that by applying our reason, we can
improve ourselves.
then.

Plato's philosophical project is safe,

What the conclusion that virtue comes from divine

dispensation comes to, then, is a gesture toward the mystery
of how the student switches from pursuing inquiry for
external goods to internal goods.

Some students respond and

some do not— even when conditions are optimal.

Some students

will continually see the practice of examining one's life as
a means to something beyond it, while others will see the
value implicit in it.

'

The success of teaching virtue, then,

does not entirely depend on how the teaching goes about.

The

student must contribute on her own, and the teacher can never
be able to bring that about.
The earlier distinction between the quarrelsome
questioners and the conversational questioners (at 75d) is at
the heart of the issue here.

What moral education amounts to

is a change of character, and when certain dispositions that

113
cannot be effected by anyone else but the student are the
preconditions for, or preclusions of, successful moral
inquiry, from the point of view of the educator, education is
as much a question of grace as it is of cirriculum.

For the

student as for the teacher, the transition comes out of
nowhere.

The value of the examined life becomes evident in

the same way that aspects of certain pictures snap into focus
when reflected upon (e.g., the Jastrow duck-rabbit).

An

account of how the change comes about cannot be given,
because it would require a description from within a certain
framework, and the transition in moral education is a change
of frameworks.
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